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For the past three decades, common wisdom in the legal profession 
has maintained that the cost of trials, and the trial process itself, are 
too time-consuming and too expensive to maintain.  In May 2010, 
elite lawyers, federal judges, and prominent legal scholars gathered 
at Duke Law School to discuss these issues and the future of civil 
process in the federal courts.  Most participants agreed that the focus 
of federal rules reform should be reigning in the high costs and delay 
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of civil litigation.  In a world of electronic discovery and 
electronically stored information, the costs of litigation were 
undoubtedly skyrocketing.  If discovery had always been ripe for 
abuse, the ubiquity of electronically stored information made it all the 
more so. 
Yet empirical data presented at the conference told a different 
story.  The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) reported that in its study of 
federal cases that had closed in the 2008 calendar year, the median 
cost of litigation for defendants was $20,000, including attorneys’ 
fees.  For plaintiffs, the median cost was even less, at $15,000, with 
some reporting costs of less than $1600.  Rather than out-of-control 
discovery costs emerging from the electronic discovery era, the FJC 
found median discovery costs represented 3.3% of the amount at 
stake in litigation. 
The results were surprising to those in attendance, but they 
shouldn’t have been.  The FJC’s 2009 data were consistent with a 
line of similar studies conducted every few years and dating back to 
the late 1960s.  Empirical work has simply never provided support for 
the widespread belief that the system takes too long, costs too much, 
and is in desperate need of repair. 
There exists a significant discrepancy between the common sense 
understanding of the civil justice system, driven by what I call the 
“cost-and-delay narrative,” and the picture that develops from the 
empirical studies.  This Article seeks to understand the resilience of 
the cost-and-delay narrative in the face of empirical data that would 
seem to undermine it.  To do so, this Article carefully analyzes the 
latest data on federal civil process showing that, even with the 
substantial changes in practice over the last decade, there is 
remarkable continuity in the findings of empirical studies.  Equally 
consistent, this Article explains, is the cost-and-delay narrative itself, 
which has thrived for decades.  The longevity of the cost-and-delay 
narrative should raise alarm bells, because it provides support for 
efforts to foreclose access to civil courts.  Building on the work of 
scholars, including Arthur Miller, who have long sought to bring this 
discrepancy to light, this Article contextualizes the cost-and-delay 
narrative, and the reforms for which it is used to advocate, as part of 
a political struggle over the nature of the regulatory state and the 
proper role of courts. 
REDA 3/19/2012  8:23 AM 
2012] The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: 1087 
Its Fallacies and Functions 
INTRODUCTION 
n May 2010, elite lawyers, federal judges, and prominent legal 
scholars gathered at Duke Law School to discuss the future of civil 
process in the federal courts.  They were invited by the U.S. Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Advisory 
Committee), and their mission was clear: to consider and propose 
solutions to the problems of cost and delay in the civil system.  In a 
world of electronic discovery and electronically stored information, 
the costs of litigation were undoubtedly skyrocketing.  If discovery 
had always been ripe for abuse, the ubiquity of electronic documents 
made it all the more so.  Conference participants arrived armed with 
proposals for reform––everything from presumptive limits on 
discovery to new forms of dispositive motions. 
Citing the mandate of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action,”1 one conference paper warned that it “may now be an empty 
promise.”2  The paper continued, “Civil litigation has become too 
cumbersome, expensive and time consuming, and the exponential 
growth of electronically stored information . . . over the past decade 
has simply added strains to an already overburdened system.”3 
The American College of Trial Lawyers (ACTL) concluded that 
the civil justice system “is in serious need of repair.  In many 
jurisdictions, today’s system takes too long and costs too much.”4  
Indeed, the ACTL report claims this is apparent even to those outside 
the legal profession: “From the outside, the system is often perceived 
 
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
2 FED. COURTS COMM., THE ASSOC. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., PROPOSALS 
FOR THE 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REGARDING THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 2 (2010), http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071920-NYCBar 
ProposalsforDuke Conference.pdf. 
3 Id.  Similar concerns were echoed by other participants.  The American College of 
Trial Lawyers (ACTL) and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal 
System (IAALS) collaborated on a project “conceived as an outgrowth of increasing 
concerns that problems in the civil justice system, especially those relating to discovery, 
have resulted in unacceptable delays and prohibitive expense.”  THE AM. COLL. OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS ON DISCOVERY & THE INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 
FINAL REPORT 1 (2009) [hereinafter ACTL & IAALS], available at http://www.actl.com 
/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID 
=4008.  However, several conference participants dissented from this view. 
4 ACTL & IAALS, supra note 3, at 2. 
I
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as cumbersome and inefficient.  The emergence of various forms of 
alternative dispute resolution emphasizes the point.”5 
The Duke Civil Litigation Conference opened with a panel 
presenting the empirical data that had been compiled expressly to 
shed light on the conference’s concerns with electronic discovery, 
cost, and delay.  Yet when the researchers from the Federal Judicial 
Center (FJC) took their seats that morning, their findings were not as 
expected.  To the disbelief of many at this venerable gathering, the 
FJC reported that the median cost of litigation for defendants was 
$20,000, including attorneys’ fees.6  For plaintiffs, the median cost 
was even less, at $15,000, with some reporting costs of less than 
$1600.7  Only at the ninety-fifth percentile did reported costs reach 
$280,000 for plaintiffs and $300,000 for defendants.8  The median 
estimate of stakes in the litigation for plaintiffs was $160,000, with 
estimates ranging from $15,000 at the tenth percentile to almost $4 
million at the ninety-fifth percentile.9  The median estimate of the 
stakes by defendants’ attorneys was $200,000, with estimates ranging 
from $15,000 at the tenth percentile to $5 million at the ninety-fifth 
percentile.10  Furthermore, the discovery costs that animated the Duke 
Conference organizers and participants did not appear to be, in the 
vast majority of cases, significant or disproportionate.  The FJC study 
found that the median percentage of litigation costs incurred in 
 
5 Id. 
6 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PRELIMINARY 
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 
(2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1 
.pdf.  The study conducted by the FJC undertook a survey of discovery costs and time to 
resolution of a large cross section of cases closed in 2008 in the federal system.  Id. at 77.  
Certain features of the closed-case study make the data particularly worthwhile in 
illuminating the true nature of cost, delay, and discovery in the federal system.  Because 
the study was designed with discovery-related issues in mind, cases in which discovery 
and discovery-related issues would be unlikely to occur were filtered out from the pool.  
Id.  Thus, excluded from the data set were prisoner civil rights and habeas cases, social 
security cases, bankruptcy appeals, student loan collection actions, land condemnation 
cases, forfeiture actions, and asbestos products liability cases.  Id.  Out of the remaining 
case pool, any cases terminating in less than sixty days were deleted.  Id.  Finally, of the 
remaining pool, any case that either terminated by trial or had been pending four years or 
longer when it terminated was included in the sample.  Id.  Thus the sample was carefully 
groomed to provide data on discovery, erring on the side of overestimating rather than 
underestimating the extent of discovery itself and overall cost and time to disposition. 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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discovery was twenty percent for plaintiffs and twenty-seven percent 
for defendants.11  Perhaps most surprising was the finding that, at the 
median, the reported costs of discovery, including attorneys’ fees, 
constituted 1.6% of the reported stakes for plaintiffs and 3.3% of the 
reported stakes for defendants.12  The 2009 FJC study rang false.13  It 
did not support anything that attorneys knew about the civil justice 
system.14  And the findings did not appear to resemble the practices 
of the audience assembled. 
But in fact, the findings of the 2009 FJC study were not an 
anomaly.  Decades of empirical work have reached similar 
conclusions, supporting the view that the federal civil system is 
highly effective in most cases, that total costs develop in line with 
stakes, and that discovery volume and cost is proportional to the 
amount at stake.  As early as 1971, a study undertaken by Columbia 
Law School to investigate early criticisms of discovery concluded that 
“[t]he costs of discovery do not appear to be oppressive, as a general 
matter, either in relation to ability to pay or to the stakes of the 
litigation.”15  Since 1971, numerous studies have made findings 
consistent with this statement.16 
 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Panelists and conference participants seemed unable to make sense of the FJC 
findings.  Justice Rebecca Kourlis, introducing another study that surveyed in-house 
counsel at Fortune 200 companies, described the FJC data as a subset of the federal docket 
different from the Fortune 200’s cases.  Similarly, Lorna Schofield, presenting on behalf of 
the ABA’s Section on Litigation, described the discrepancies between the ABA survey 
results and the FJC survey results as “two different populations with two different kinds of 
cases.”  Yet the 2009 FJC study was not a “subset” or a “different population.”  On the 
contrary, it reflected a broad cross section of federal cases, and the sample was carefully 
groomed to ensure that the largest cases would be represented.  Author’s Notes from the 
2010 Civil Litigation Conference at the Duke University School of Law (May 10–11, 
2010) (on file with author). 
14 Presenting on the empirical data panel along with the FJC were representatives of 
both the ABA Section on Litigation who reported the results of a survey of its members 
and the Senior Counsel of Litigation and Legal Policy for General Electric, who shared the 
findings of a survey of Fortune 200 in-house counsel.  Unlike the 2009 FJC study, the 
ABA and the Fortune 200 surveys found significantly higher costs in general, and 
discovery-related costs specifically.  LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION 
COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 2–3 (2010).  For example, the Fortune 200 survey 
found that costs had increased for survey respondents by seventy-eight percent since 2000.  
Id. at 3. 
15 FED. R. CIV. P. TITLE V advisory committee’s note (discussing the 1970 amendments 
to the discovery rules). 
16 For a detailed discussion of these studies, see infra Parts I and II. 
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There exists a significant discrepancy between the common-sense 
understanding of the civil justice system, captured by what I call the 
“cost-and-delay narrative,” and the picture that develops from the 
empirical studies.  This Article seeks to understand the resilience of 
the cost-and-delay narrative in the face of empirical data that would 
seem to undermine it.  The longevity of the cost-and-delay narrative 
should raise alarm bells because it provides support for efforts to 
foreclose access to civil courts and to shift the focus of procedural 
lawmaking away from the facilitation of legal claims and the 
remedying of legal wrongs to limiting the resources expended in 
investigating and vindicating such wrongs. 
Scholars have produced a fascinating and insightful literature on 
this strange discrepancy.  Much of the attention, however, has 
understandably focused on highlighting the lack of empirical 
foundation for cost-and-delay concerns.  This can only take us so far.  
Given the narrative’s continued persuasiveness over a span of 
decades, in the face of empirical work that appears to contradict its 
premises, we can safely say that resilience of the cost-and-delay 
narrative does not depend on its accuracy in reflecting the state of 
civil litigation.  What is now required is to understand the social 
forces that produce the narrative and sustain its power.  While 
scholars have made preliminary efforts to explain these social forces, 
the literature has yet to address the issue systematically.  Accordingly, 
this Article takes account of and assesses these explanations, laying a 
foundation for future investigation. 
The next two Parts of this Article provide a description of the cost-
and-delay narrative, as well as an account of the discrepancy between 
the picture it paints of the civil justice system and that revealed 
through empirical inquiry.  Part I describes the contours of the cost-
and-delay narrative, the ideas it conveys, in what venues it is 
promulgated, and what reforms of civil process have, in part, relied on 
it.  Part II then examines empirical data from the last forty years, 
beginning with a detailed analysis of the findings presented at the 
Duke Conference. 
In Part III, the analysis turns to the scholarly literature analyzing 
the cost-and-delay narrative.  This Part examines the various ways 
that commentators have explained the resilience of the narrative.  In 
order to understand and evaluate the explanatory power of these 
accounts, this Article identifies three loose categories of explanation.  
The first category explains the resilience of the cost-and-delay 
narrative as a product of certain cultural and psychological factors.  
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The second category, comprising what I describe as sociological 
factors, identifies the structure of the legal profession and financial 
interests of routine corporate defendants as the dominant forces 
driving the cost-and-delay narrative.  Finally, I turn to the third 
category, the political–historical factors, consisting of explanations 
that seek to understand the cost-and-delay narrative as part of a 
broader political discussion not limited to the context of procedural 
reform.  Specifically, these analyses contextualize the narrative, and 
the reforms it is used to advocate, as part of a political struggle over 
the nature of the regulatory state and the proper role of courts within 
that structure.  By systematically examining the causalities suggested 
by literature on the cost-and-delay narrative, this Article finds that the 
political–historical explanations offer us the richest avenues for 
further investigation of this phenomenon while also providing 
opportunities for reinvigorating a defense of access to civil justice. 
I 
THE CONTOURS OF THE COST-AND-DELAY NARRATIVE 
The cost-and-delay narrative in its contemporary form may be 
traced back to the 1970s.17  An early articulation of the narrative can 
be found in then-Chief Justice Warren Burger’s civil reform efforts.18  
In 1976, Chief Justice Burger sponsored the Pound Conference, 
which was entitled “Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice.”19  Though the title of the conference gives 
the impression of a very broad inquiry, it was instead focused on only 
two topics, themselves interrelated.  The first concern was 
overburdened courts.20  Here, the conference sought to tackle “the 
problem of the overcrowding of the courts, and the attendant issues of 
 
17 Concerns about the relationship between discovery and cost were, however, already 
apparent.  In the early 1960s, the Advisory Committee commissioned social science 
research to examine costs and concerns associated with discovery, in what later became 
known as the Columbia Project.  WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 41–43 (1968).  The findings of that study led the Advisory 
Committee to conclude there was no problem of cost and delay.  See supra note 15. 
18 This is not meant to imply that the Chief Justice was the originator of civil justice’s 
preoccupation with cost and delay.  Rather, his efforts provide a useful example of the 
themes represented in the cost-and-delay narrative, presented in a high-profile forum 
comprising members of the legal establishment. 
19 THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 5–6 (A. Leo 
Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). 
20 Id. at 270–71. 
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the costs of litigation.”21  The second topic identified by the Chief 
Justice was, “how can we serve the interests of justice with processes 
more speedy and less expensive?”22  Thus the conference 
concentrated on the costs and delays facing the system and its users.  
Chief Justice Burger’s explanation of the second topic is particularly 
illuminating.  What the Chief Justice’s question does is transform the 
Federal Rules’ interest in just determination of claims into a quest for 
speedy and inexpensive resolutions.  That is, justice becomes speed 
and inexpense. 
This peculiar arrangement is actually quite common to the cost-
and-delay narrative.  The narrative gains its moral force from the 
sustaining assumption that the present functioning of the courts is 
unfair.  The injustice of the system is related to the openness of the 
civil courts.  The cry of the reform movement to resolve the undue 
cost and delay in the civil system gains traction as it promises to curb 
the abuses of unethical, selfish lawyers and greedy claimants and to 
rescue the defendants that may fall victim to them.  The narrative 
asserts that crippling cost and delay are enemies of access because 
high costs can bar worthy parties from filing suit, or may force them 
to take a low settlement to avoid the higher costs of litigating.  
Because cost and delay are at the root of procedural injustice, 
mechanisms that would maximize efficiency are applauded and those 
that carry with them costs and require time—for example, discovery, 
access to appeals, and formality of process—are disfavored. 
To address these concerns of the cost-and-delay narrative, Chief 
Justice Burger sought to establish a reform agenda for the final 
quarter of the twentieth century, focusing squarely on securing a more 
just system by driving costs down and limiting delays.23  His 
 
21 Id. at 273 (quoting the Attorney General of the United States, The Honorable Edward 
H. Levi).  As three past presidents of the ABA explained in their foreword to the 
conference proceedings, “The plain and unavoidable fact is that our judicial system, state 
and federal, is a vessel filled to the brim and overflowing.  Nothing more can be added 
without taking something out.”  Id. at 11–12.  Moreover, “[w]ays and means must be 
found for more efficient and expeditious disposition of litigated controversies . . . .”  Id. at 
11–12. 
22 Id. at 6. 
23 Chief Justice Burger foresaw that his agenda for the Pound Conference would be 
viewed as aiming to limit access to the courts.  He denied that this was the objective, 
invoking instead a desire to identify the “speediest and the least expensive means of 
meeting the” dispute resolution needs of the public.  Id. at 32.  The thoughtful observer 
may wonder how cost and delay can function as a single narrative, propelling the courts 
toward a less accessible future.  Certainly concerns over delay might appear to weigh on 
the side of access to justice, as delaying tactics or merely inefficient processes lengthen the 
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proposed solutions portrayed a single-minded focus on efficiency.24  
He suggested that the system find new ways to provide resolution in 
small claims that would be “economically feasible,” suggesting de-
professionalized mechanisms with no appeal right.25  The Chief 
Justice hailed Japan for having far fewer lawyers “due to a long 
history of informal ‘community’ and private processes for resolving 
disputes without litigation and, hence, without lawyers, judges and the 
attendant expense and delays.”26  In this formulation, litigation itself 
is a negative process, best avoided (or diverted).  As such, lawyers 
whose job it is to engage in litigation are also a negative, and their 
presence in large numbers in society is troubling.  In line with this 
pejorative view of civil claiming, Chief Justice Burger advocated for 
increased use of arbitration, supported by his projection that “delays 
and costs will rise.”27 
Chief Justice Burger’s project of reorganizing procedural reform 
around cost-and-delay concerns was warmly received in rule-reform 
circles.  This approach has guided procedural transformation for the 
ensuing three decades.  The impact of cost-and-delay concerns on the 
rulemaking process and congressional legislation throughout the 
1980s and 1990s has been carefully documented by other scholars.28 
 
time before a plaintiff gets her day in court, or may very well foreclose the courtroom 
altogether.  Yet, as the sources in this Part make clear, delay is most often coupled with 
cost in discussion of civil justice reform.  In conversations about procedural reform, 
proposed solutions tend to advocate limiting access.  In fact, delay is understood from the 
perspective of a defendant who is left at the mercy of plaintiff’s litigation indefinitely.  On 
a related note, to the extent that delay is a result of the heavy influx of cases to the court 
system, limiting access helps to resolve issues of delay.  Thus, limiting suits helps to 
resolve not only cost but also delay concerns.  For examples of how delay concerns might 
be articulated from a plaintiff’s perspective, see the attorney comments cited infra note 
100 (quoting comments from the 2009 FJC study reflecting frustrations of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys with the assumptions of the survey instrument). 
24 THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 19, at 32–33. 
25 Id. at 33. 
26 Id. 
27 Id.  “I submit a reappraisal of the values of the arbitration process is in order, to 
determine whether, like the Administrative Procedure Act, arbitration can divert litigation 
to other channels.”  Id. 
28 E.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Discovery 
Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) 
[hereinafter Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray]; Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-
Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992) [hereinafter Mullenix, 
The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice]; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and 
Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529 (2001). 
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In the aftermath of the Pound Conference, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) convened a follow-up task force that issued a 
report calling for a revision of the discovery rules, given the 
allegation that they are open to abuse and serve to “escalate the cost 
of litigation, to delay adjudication unduly and to coerce unfair 
settlements.”29  The task force also called for revision of the rules 
governing sanctions in order to combat situations in which 
“inadequate and improper pleadings give evidence of contributing to 
delay and increased expense of litigation.”30  These revisions and 
others were taken up by the Judicial Conference and Congress as civil 
justice reform became synonymous with decreasing cost and delay.31 
Although spanning over thirty years, the cost-and-delay narrative 
evinces a consistency in its language and concerns over time.  In that 
period, there have been repeated revisions to the Federal Rules and to 
procedural doctrine, yet the narrative remains largely intact.  The 
early 1990s ushered in significant procedural changes on two fronts, 
through congressional legislation in the Civil Justice Reform Act 
(CJRA) and through the 1993 amendments to the Rules.  Both of 
these initiatives gained support in significant part because they aimed 
to address rising cost and delay in civil litigation.  The passage of the 
CJRA in particular took place in the context of a national discussion 
focused on a conception of the court system as exorbitantly 
expensive, slow, and, accordingly, the site of rampant abuse of 
justice. 
The cost-and-delay themes articulated at the Pound Conference 
were visible once again in both the structure and the legislative 
 
29 AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE POUND CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP TASK FORCE 
(1996), reprinted in 74 F.R.D. 159, 191 (1976). 
30 Id. at 193.  Notably, empirical data published prior to the Burger conference had 
already questioned the connection between discovery and excessive costs or abusive 
practices.  These are discussed at greater length infra Part II.  In 1983 the Federal Rules 
were amended to reflect changes in line with both of these recommendations.  To address 
discovery concerns and in hopes of limiting costs and encouraging early settlement, Rule 
16 was amended to foster early judicial intervention, which was expected to reduce cost 
and delay resulting when parties were left to manage pretrial proceedings independently.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (discussing the 1983 amendment).  The rules 
were further amended to address the specter of pleadings filed in bad faith to impose cost 
and delay on an adversary.  The Rule 11 amendment sought to “streamline the litigation 
process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory 
committee’s note (discussing the 1983 amendment). 
31 This phenomenon has different articulations, focusing in turn on cost to parties, cost 
to the court system (expenditure of court resources), systemic delay from too many cases, 
and case-based delay from inappropriate practice techniques. 
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history of the CJRA.  The legislative history identified two related 
crises facing the courts: high cost and delays (which further raise 
costs) and a scarcity of federal judges (which also increases costs and 
delays).32  Chief Justice Burger’s equation of justice with speed and 
cost also reemerged.  The legislative history of the CJRA applauds the 
goal set forth in Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
ensure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes in our 
Nation’s Federal courts. High costs, long delays and insufficient 
judicial resources all too often leave this time-honored promise 
unfulfilled.  By improving the quality of the process of civil 
litigation, this legislation will contribute to improvement of the 
quality of justice that the civil justice system delivers.33 
As Linda Mullenix notes, 
Although Congress, in the legislative history, identified three 
fundamental values [justice, speed, affordability], the Civil Justice 
Reform Act itself focuses exclusively on two: cost and delay.  The 
independent value of justice is absent from the statutory mandate, 
and by inference, it must be assumed that Congress equated 
reducing cost and delay with achieving justice.34 
Notably, Congress made no findings concerning the existence, nature, 
or extent of cost-and-delay problems in the courts.  The CJRA 
followed the common model of assuming a cost-and-delay problem 
and devising solutions to address it, without seeking evidence of the 
excessive costs or delay. 35 
 
32 S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 1–2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6804–05. 
33 Id. 
34 Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, supra note 28, at 390 
n.46. 
35 See Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. II 1990) (congressional 
statement of findings).  The Act mandated each federal district to develop a civil justice 
expense and delay reduction plan and presented six findings, each of which assumed a 
problem of cost and delay in civil litigation requiring urgent action. 
(1) The problems of cost and delay in civil litigation in any United States district 
court must be addressed in the context of the full range of demands made on the 
district court’s resources by both civil and criminal matters. 
(2) The courts, the litigants, the litigants’ attorneys, and the Congress and the 
executive branch, share responsibility for cost and delay in civil litigation and its 
impact on access to the courts, adjudication of cases on the merits, and the ability 
of the civil justice system to provide proper and timely judicial relief for 
aggrieved parties. 
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That same year, Vice President Dan Quayle gave a much-
publicized speech to the ABA criticizing the civil justice system as 
the main impediment to the competitiveness of the American 
economy and advocating reform.36  The reform agenda focused 
significantly on discovery and relied upon the familiar assertions that 
“discovery is 80 percent of the problem”; that it “too often becomes 
an instrument of delay and even harassment”; and that unnecessary 
discovery “can disrupt or put on hold a company’s entire research and 
development program.”37  Quayle asked, “Is it right that people with 
disputes come up against staggering expense and delay?”38  Quayle’s 
speech, though taking aim specifically at discovery, also reiterated the 
general concern of the Pound Conference: the injustice of subjecting 
defendants to the expenditure of resources that arises when a party is 
sued.  With litigation itself a suspect activity, the impositions of a 
lawsuit become a grave injustice, diverting defendants from the 
legitimate and beneficial activities to which they would otherwise be 
attending.39 
 
(3) The solutions to problems of cost and delay must include significant 
contributions by the courts, the litigants, the litigants’ attorneys, and by the 
Congress and the executive branch. 
(4) In identifying, developing, and implementing solutions to problems of cost 
and delay in civil litigation, it is necessary to achieve a method of consultation so 
that individual judicial officers, litigants, and litigants’ attorneys who have 
developed techniques for litigation management and cost and delay reduction can 
effectively and promptly communicate those techniques to all participants in the 
civil justice system. 
(5) Evidence suggests that an effective litigation management and cost and 
delay reduction program should incorporate several interrelated principles. . . . 
(6) Because the increasing volume and complexity of civil and criminal cases 
imposes increasingly heavy workload burdens on judicial officers, clerks of 
court, and other court personnel, it is necessary to create an effective 
administrative structure to ensure ongoing consultation and communication 
regarding effective litigation management and cost and delay reduction 
principles and techniques. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
36 Vice President Dan Quayle, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Bar 
Association (Aug. 13, 1991).  Mullenix provides a cogent analysis of the relationship 
between the Vice President’s speech and the media treatment of the civil justice reform 
issue in Discovery in Disarray, supra note 28, at 1400–02. 
37 Vice President Dan Quayle, supra note 36. 
38 Id. 
39 A significant theme of the early 1990s’ cost-and-delay narrative was the deleterious 
impact of litigation cost and delay on U.S. economic competitors. 
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Although both legislation and amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in the early nineties took aim at cost and delay in the 
civil system, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules was once again 
focused on the issue just a few years later.  As Jeffrey Stempel has 
carefully documented,40 the Advisory Committee convened a 
conference in 1997 to explore the need for reform of the discovery 
rules.41  In selecting discovery as a target for reform, the Committee 
posited that “[i]f any aspect of the rules is broken, discovery is it.”42  
At its October 1996 meeting, it appointed a discovery subcommittee 
to investigate discovery issues and possible rule reform.43  While the 
impetus for the appointment was the “opt-out” provision of the 1993 
amendment concerning initial disclosure,44 the function was 
nonetheless understood to be the reduction of cost and delay. 
 
40 Stempel, supra note 28. 
41 Chair of the Advisory Committee, Paul Niemeyer, explained the focus thus: 
[A]s chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, I initiated a fundamental 
reexamination of the discovery rules in the fall of 1996 to find out if the 
procedure in place for providing full disclosure is too expensive to justify its 
contribution to civil process and whether amendments can be adopted to make 
discovery more efficient and satisfying to parties to litigation. 
Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of 
Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 520–21 (1998). 
42 Stempel, supra note 28, at 554 n.141 (quoting CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., 
MINUTES FROM THE OCTOBER 6–7, 1996, MEETING).  The Committee’s concern with 
discovery was fundamentally bound up with a concern about cost and delay: “The Civil 
Justice Reform Act manifests concern with the costs and delays associated with discovery, 
and may justify further study.”  CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES FROM THE 
OCTOBER 6–7, 1996, MEETING.  In his introductory piece to the Boston College Law 
Review’s Symposium issue on discovery, which emerged out of the Advisory Committee’s 
1997 Boston Conference, Judge Paul Niemeyer, Chair of the Advisory Committee, 
acknowledged that there were very good reasons not to engage in further reform of the 
discovery rules.  As he described it, there were “persuasive indicators that the discovery 
rules are not broken.”  Niemeyer, supra note 41, at 517.  Yet, he argued, two persistent 
questions justified the Advisory Committee’s renewed examination of the discovery 
regime: “1. When fully used, is the discovery process too expensive for what it contributes 
to the dispute resolution process; and 2. Are there rules changes that can be made which 
might reduce the cost and delay of discovery without undermining a policy of full 
disclosure?”  Id. 
43 “The Committee appeared to have a general view that discovery was problematic, 
that discovery practice was deteriorating for a variety of reasons, that experiments with 
discovery reform on the state and local level appeared to be working, and that some 
change in the Federal Rules was apt.”  Stempel, supra note 28, at 554–55. 
44 Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: 
Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 164 (1999) (citing Judicial 
Conference, Alternative Proposals for Reduction of Cost and Delay: Assessment of 
Principles, Guidelines and Techniques, 175 F.R.D. 62, 98 (1997)). 
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Following in the same vein as earlier cost-and-delay-driven 
reforms, this discovery review solicited empirical research but 
ultimately ignored its conclusions.  Two studies served as the 
“centerpiece research” of the conference.  This research included the 
1997 Rand study and the 1997 FJC study, which were prepared at the 
discovery subcommittee’s request.45  Those studies plainly cut against 
the discovery-abuse narrative.46  Yet, as Stempel describes it, the 
“gravitational pull of the venerable myth of discovery abuse” meant 
that the reforms to emerge from that process were nonetheless 
designed to tackle the “problem” of discovery abuse.47 
The discussion surrounding appointment of a discovery 
subcommittee gives some indication of how the cost-and-delay 
narrative informed the Advisory Committee’s inquiry.  The October 
1996 committee minutes explain the appointment of a discovery 
subcommittee thus: 
[I]t was observed that most studies of the causes of popular 
dissatisfaction with the administration of civil procedure focus in 
large part on discovery.  Discovery is expensive.  Discovery is often 
conducted in a mean-spirited way.  Discovery is used as a strategic 
tool, not to facilitate resolution of a controversy.  Attorney self-
regulation too often fails to work, as adversariness gets in the way 
of more professional behavior.48 
Advisory Committee Chair Niemeyer identified three central 
questions guiding the Committee’s discovery project: what is the cost 
of discovery; do the costs exceed the benefits to such a degree that 
requires action; and, if remedies are needed, can changes be made 
without interfering with the full development of information for 
trial?49 
The Advisory Committee operated on the presumption that 
discovery reform should be directed at whether the cost of discovery 
exceeds its benefits, and if so, whether reforms can be devised that 
“do not interfere with the full development of information for trial.”50  
Despite the failure of three decades of empirical studies to verify 
 
45 See infra notes 132–42 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra Part II.A. 
47 Stempel, supra note 28, at 555. 
48 CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES FROM THE OCTOBER 17–18, 1996, 
MEETING. 
49 Stempel, supra note 28, at 555. 
50 Id. (quoting CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES FROM THE OCTOBER 6–7, 
1997, MEETING). 
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concerns over the costs of discovery and potential abuse, the 
Advisory Committee nonetheless took as its starting premise that this 
was the inquiry to be investigated.51 
The story of the 2000 amendments helps to illustrate the great force 
of the cost-and-delay narrative.  In meetings leading up to the 2000 
amendments, the discovery subcommittee reported its findings: 
“Discovery seems to be working quite well in general.”52  Yet, 
strangely, the subcommittee recommended a major revision of the 
discovery rules, one that generated significant opposition from the 
bar.  At the Advisory Committee’s October 1997 meeting, it was 
stated that “[o]ut-of-control discovery is common,” despite the 
subcommittee’s own review of the empirical data that led it to 
conclude that discovery was generally working well.53  The view that 
discovery was “out of control” was once again assumed without any 
effort to examine whether that was true.54 
Most recently, in May of 2010, the Advisory Committee hosted the 
Duke Conference to discuss possible solutions to the costs of civil 
litigation in the federal courts.  In advance of the conference, the 
Advisory Committee solicited empirical studies, scholarly papers, and 
commentary from the bench and bar, a process that began over a year 
in advance of the conference date.55  The submissions to the Duke 
 
51 Thus, it appears, other discovery concerns, such as informational asymmetry and 
tactics that might be aimed at shielding client information from one’s adversary, were off 
the table from the start.  As Stempel describes it, the reforms “plac[e] the burdens of 
discovery reform on those seeking information rather than upon those opposing its 
release.”  Id. at 556. 
52 CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., supra note 42. 
53 CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES FROM THE MARCH 16–17, 1998, 
MEETING. 
54 Note that certain Advisory Committee members moved to abandon the proposed 
limitation on the scope of discovery arguing that it would: (1) encourage resistance to 
discovery, (2) spawn satellite litigation due to ambiguity of the proposed language, and (3) 
limit enforcement of regulatory laws including excessive force, products liability, and 
employment discrimination.  Stempel, supra note 28, at 570.  They argued that the ability 
to obtain a broader subject-matter scope of discovery through application to the court was 
no cure, as it served to shift transaction costs and relied on major investment of judicial 
time that made it likely that discovery would not happen.  Id. at 570–71.  Judge Shira 
Scheindlin emphasized that empirical data did not support a need for change.  Id. at 571.  
Scheindlin also opposed the scope change because she viewed it as “polarizing,” pointing 
out that the public comments break down almost exactly along the lines of whether the 
attorney generally represents plaintiffs or defendants.  Id.  This effort ultimately failed.  Id. 
at 572. 
55 John G. Koeltl, Introduction: Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 DUKE L.J. 537 
(2010). 
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Conference reflected widespread pessimism about the civil justice 
system among legal professionals.  The federal courts committee of 
the New York City Bar Association described the aim of Rule 1 as 
“an empty promise,” describing the system as “too cumbersome, 
expensive and time consuming.”56  The American College of Trial 
Lawyers (ACTL) explained that its member survey was motivated by 
“increasing concerns” about “unacceptable delays and prohibitive 
expense.”57  A report on litigation costs at major companies lamented 
that “[t]he reality is that the high transaction costs of litigation, and in 
particular the costs of discovery, threaten to exceed the amount at 
issue in all but the largest cases.”58  Detailing the findings of a survey 
of Fortune 200 companies, the authors wrote, “The survey confirms 
empirically what corporate counsel have long known anecdotally—
the transaction costs of litigation against large companies, especially 
discovery, are so high that the mandate of Rule 1 . . . is simply not 
being met.”59 
Thus, the concerns embedded in the cost-and-delay narrative 
served as an impetus for Duke Conference activity.  The bulk of what 
the Duke Conference labeled “empirical data”60 consisted of opinion 
surveys that reflected the concerns and beliefs among legal 
professionals.  These surveys make clear that the cost-and-delay 
narrative is very much still in play.  One prominent contribution was 
the result of collaboration between the ACTL and the Institute for the 
Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS).61  The ACTL 
and the IAALS developed a survey that was administered to the 
Fellows of the ACTL, the American Bar Association’s Section on 
Litigation, and the National Employment Lawyers Association 
 
56 FED. COURTS COMM., supra note 2, at 2. 
57 ACTL & IAALS, supra note 3, at 1. 
58 LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 14, at 2. 
59 Id.  The authors conclude that average outside litigation cost increased seventy-three 
percent between 2000 and 2008, and that average annual litigation costs as a percentage of 
revenues increased seventy-eight percent between 2000 and 2008.  Id. at 2–3. 
60 The data presented were mostly attorney opinion surveys that provided data on what 
beliefs attorneys have about the civil procedural system.  It generally did not collect data 
that could provide information on how the system actually operates. 
61 The IAALS’s existence is, itself, a reflection of the persistence of the cost-and-delay 
narrative.  The organization’s “mission is to participate in the achievement of a 
transparent, fair, and cost-effective civil justice system that is accountable to and trusted 
by those it serves.” ACTL & IAALS, supra note 3, at iii.  This general mission is 
supported “[i]n the civil justice reform area[ by] studying the relationship between existing 
Rules of Civil Procedure and cost and delay in the civil justice system.”  Id. 
REDA 3/19/2012  8:23 AM 
2012] The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: 1101 
Its Fallacies and Functions 
(NELA).62  The ACTL and the IAALS identified several themes 
emerging from their survey.  They confirmed that costs are too high 
and cases take too long.63  As a result, meritorious cases are never 
brought, and frivolous or marginal cases are settled in order to avoid 
the high costs of litigation.64  The ACTL and the IAALS also reported 
that, because issues are not identified early enough, discovery remains 
unfocused, resulting in costly discovery that can become its own 
end.65  These phenomena—great cost, slow process, and delay in 
issue-identification—appear to open the door to abuse.66  In these 
surveys, attorney opinion was consistent with decades-old beliefs 
about cost and delay.  Discovery was cited as the top cause of delay in 
civil litigation, and sixty-six percent of ABA participants reported that 
electronic discovery is always abused.  Seventy-five percent of ABA 
respondents “confirmed the fact that electronic discovery has resulted 
in a disproportionate increase in the expense of discovery and thus an 
increase in total litigation expense.”67  The majority of ACTL Fellows 
surveyed did not believe the discovery system works well, and 
seventy-one percent “thought that discovery is used as a tool to force 
settlement.”68  In reliance on these survey results, the ACTL and the 
IAALS suggested several reforms to the Federal Rules, including 
several discovery proposals that would limit the availability of 
discovery beyond initial disclosures, with a broad range of possible 
limitations as to scope, type, persons from whom discovery can be 
sought, and numerical or time limitations.69  The ACTL and the 
IAALS proposed, among other things, that the civil system adopt a 
principle of “limited discovery proportionately tied to the claims 
 
62 The survey administered to members of the ABA Section on Litigation and of NELA 
was a modified version of that administered to the ACTL Fellows.  For a detailed account 
of the differences across the survey instruments, see EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS 
WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE (2010). 
63 ACTL & IAALS, supra note 3, at 2. 
64 Id.; see also LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 14. 
65 ACTL & IAALS, supra note 3, at 2. 
66 Id.  In explaining the problems with electronic discovery, the report quoted one 
respondent’s reply that “[t]he bigger the case the more the abuse and the bigger the 
nightmare.”  Id. 
67 Id. at 16. 
68 Id. at 9. 
69 Id. at 8–17. 
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actually at issue, after which there will be no more.”70  The clear 
thrust of these proposals is to reign in a discovery system that is 
perceived currently as having no limits and enabling discovery 
disproportionate to the benefits and the matter at issue.  The ACTL 
and IAALS operate on the basis of survey results remarkably 
consistent with the story of civil litigation that has been told since the 
1970s.  As we shall see below, however, these opinions are out of step 
with the hard data to emerge from the Duke Conference.  Attorney 
impressions captured by the opinion surveys are in conflict with the 
picture that emerges from available empirical data.71 
Just how distorted a vision of civil process is the cost-and-delay 
narrative?  We turn in the next Part to the empirical studies 
themselves to get a sense of just how wide a divergence there is 
between the cost-and-delay narrative and empirical research. 
II 
THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
There are limitations to what the empirical studies we have can tell 
us.  Many of the empirical questions we ask are not readily 
quantifiable.  For instance, how many meritorious claims are not 
brought due to the high cost of litigation, to heightened pleading 
standards, or to other procedural barriers?  Other questions implicated 
by the cost narrative are not amenable to an empirical answer.  For 
example, how valuable is the ability to bring legal claims in court?  
And, relatedly, how open should courts be to claim making?  Do the 
courts function primarily as sites for the resolution of differences 
among private parties, or does their value lie substantially in 
interpreting and enforcing the law—both common and statutory?  
Some of the debates about procedure touch fundamentally on our 
vision of what role we would like courts to play in society.  An 
accurate empirical picture can help us have an informed debate about 
the issue, but it cannot suggest which is the best role for courts to 
play.72  With these limitations in mind, we turn now to existing 
empirical data, spanning the last four decades, to understand that the 
 
70 Id. at 10. 
71 See infra Part II.A. 
72 Arthur Miller provides a detailed consideration of the difficulties attendant to 
empirical work in this area and the scope of questions not susceptible to empirical review.  
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010). 
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cost narrative’s persuasiveness does not rest on an empirical 
foundation. 
A.  The 2009 FJC Study 
In 2008, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee began a new and 
wide-ranging endeavor to generate information that would help 
determine how best to reform the federal procedural rules.73  As in 
prior years, the Committee focused substantial attention on discovery 
practice.  Despite years of discovery reform, and with the latest 
changes to discovery practice still newly minted, the Committee 
nonetheless framed its initial empirical inquiry around discovery.  
Specifically, it aimed to understand the problem that discovery poses 
in terms of litigation cost and delay, as well as to determine how 
electronic discovery was working in light of the 2006 amendments to 
the Federal Rules.74 
The Committee’s focus made sense.  In the ten years since it had 
last commissioned data on discovery from the FJC, the discovery 
landscape had changed dramatically.  In the decade since 1998, 
communication and storage of information seem to have shifted 
overwhelmingly to electronic means.  It seemed reasonable to 
presume that the predominance of electronically stored information 
(ESI) in the lives of the majority of Americans would lead to 
substantial changes in the amount and cost of discovery in federal 
courts.  Perhaps the findings of earlier studies would no longer hold in 
the electronic information world.  The rulemakers had already 
responded to this possibility with the 2006 amendments to the Federal 
Rules specifically addressing electronic discovery.75  The Advisory 
Committee thus sought information on the impact of these 
amendments.76 
 
73 Given the Civil Rules Advisory Committee is tasked with reviewing the civil 
procedural rules to continue to improve how civil litigation functions in the federal courts, 
it is no surprise that they were seeking to understand where new reforms would be most 
effective.  Nonetheless the Committee’s extensive efforts in organizing the Duke 
Conference are admirable.  The Committee commissioned reports from the FJC, solicited 
data through surveys of attorneys, and garnered input from judges, scholars, and local and 
national bar associations.  Koeltl, supra note 55. 
74 See id. at 538, 544. 
75 The 2006 amendments revised Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 to address concerns 
about electronic discovery practice. 
76 Koeltl, supra note 55, at 544. 
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With these concerns in mind, the Advisory Committee turned to 
the FJC to prepare a study that would help to inform the Committee 
during the Duke Conference in 2010.77  The Committee asked the 
FJC to focus on the issues that would be the subject of the Duke 
Conference, namely the costs of discovery and how electronic 
discovery was functioning under the revised rules.78  The FJC 
designed the study to focus on these issues.79 
In particular, the 2009 FJC study identified a sample of cases that 
would maximize the development of information about how 
discovery operates in the federal system.  Cases that are unlikely to 
result in discovery were excluded; cases that were important for 
understanding the cost of discovery—namely cases that had been in 
the system for four or more years and cases that had ended in trial—
were overrepresented in the sample.80 
Given the Advisory Committee’s continued concerns about 
discovery, and the widespread belief that the prevalence of electronic 
discovery had effected a sea-change in federal practice, the results of 
the 2009 FJC study were surprising, to say the least.  The 2009 FJC 
study identified the amount at stake as the greatest determinant of cost 
in civil litigation.81  While the study confirmed substantial electronic 
discovery activity, neither the increased costs nor the electronic 
discovery itself reach the level imagined by the cost narrative.82 
As the Duke Conference organizers had presumed, the use of 
electronic discovery has become common, though perhaps not 
reaching the ubiquity imagined by some advocates of reform.  Thirty 
to forty percent of cases involving discovery in the 2009 FJC study 
reported requests for production of ESI.83  Also as expected, cases 
that involved a request for ESI tended to generate a higher estimate of 
discovery costs as a percentage of total costs than did non-ESI 
 
77 LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 5. 
78 Ultimately, the study was designed with a somewhat expanded scope.  Although it 
did focus primarily on discovery, and electronic discovery in particular, the 2009 FJC 
study also sought information on case management, specific reform proposals, and 
attorney satisfaction with the Federal Rules as a whole.  See id. at 2. 
79 The 2009 FJC study was designed to parallel a previous FJC study, discussed infra 
note 130.  LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 5. 
80 The sample selection is described in detail supra note 6. 
81 LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
82 Id. at 2. 
83 Id. at 1.  Over eighty percent of all respondents reported at least some form of 
discovery activity.  Id. 
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discovery cases.84  However, in the words of the 2009 FJC study 
authors, this difference was “not substantial[].”85  Indeed, whether the 
increased costs in cases involving electronic discovery are attributable 
to the electronic discovery itself is far from clear.  When study 
respondents were asked to estimate electronic discovery costs as a 
percentage of total discovery costs, plaintiffs’ attorneys’ median 
estimate was five percent, and defendants’ was ten percent.  “In other 
words, in half of the cases with an electronic discovery request . . . 
electronic discovery costs accounted for just 5 percent for plaintiff 
attorneys’ discovery costs and 10 percent for defendant attorneys.”86 
Most significant among the data, however, were the estimates 
provided of litigation cost.  The study examined estimated costs for 
all cases in which any discovery was taken.87  The median cost 
reported by plaintiffs’ attorneys in such cases was $15,000.88  This 
 
84 Id. at 36. 
85 Id. at 39. 
86 Id. at 40.  The study’s authors explain that “defendants producing ESI do not 
consistently face higher costs than similarly situated defendants in cases without electronic 
discovery.  Factors internal to the company and its information systems, not the Federal 
Rules, are responsible for some of these costs.”  Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, 
Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 785 (2010). 
87 This comprised eighty-six percent of respondents.  LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 
8.  One weakness of much of the empirical information available is that it is survey 
information.  That is, it is not independently verifiable and relies on attorney impressions 
or self-reports of costs in a given case.  The 2009 FJC study authors explain it thus: “The 
point is obvious, but we state it for clarity’s sake: the model estimates presented in this 
section are only as good as the respondents’ reports of costs in the closed cases.”  EMERY 
G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL 
CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 2 (2010). 
88 LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 35–36.  The question asked attorneys to “estimate, 
if possible, the total litigation costs for your firm and your client in the named case, 
including the costs of discovery and any hourly fees for attorneys or paralegals.  If the case 
was handled on a contingency fee basis, please estimate the total litigation costs to your 
firm.”  Id. at 94.  The median cost reported by plaintiffs’ attorneys in electronic discovery 
cases was $30,000.  Id. at 35.  The median cost in electronic discovery cases on the 
defense side was $40,000.  Id. at 37.  The costs are generally consistent with data from a 
case-based study conducted by the FJC (1997 FJC study) adjusted for inflation.  Lee & 
Willging, supra note 86, at 770. 
 One would not want to minimize the burdens presented by costs ranging in the tens of 
thousands of dollars.  It is not difficult to imagine federal claims, particularly employment 
or civil rights claims, for which this median cost point of $15,000 or $20,000 would be 
burdensome if not prohibitively high.  But these are not the costs that Duke Conference 
organizers and participants had in mind when they described the federal system as in 
“crisis.”  A quick look at some of the discussion of the FJC data in the Duke Conference 
literature makes this clear.  See supra note 13 for examples. 
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figure was $20,000 for defendants’ attorneys.89  Attorneys were also 
asked to estimate the percentage of total cost expended in discovery.  
The median response for plaintiffs’ attorneys was twenty percent.90  
For defendants’ attorneys, the estimate of discovery cost as a 
percentage of total cost was twenty-seven percent.91 
Much of the concern over the cost of litigation generally, and of 
discovery costs in particular, centers around disproportionate costs.92  
It was therefore important to the FJC study to obtain estimates not 
only of the costs of litigation to each side but also of the ratio of costs 
to the stakes in the case.93  Here, the figures should alleviate concerns 
that total litigation or discovery costs are “out of control.”  For 
plaintiffs, the median ratio of discovery cost to stakes was 1.6%.94  
For defendants, the reported median was 3.3%.95 
Because there is no objective basis for determining what amount of 
discovery expenditure is proportionate or appropriate,96 the 2009 FJC 
study sought a normative assessment from survey respondents by 
asking them what percentage of total litigation costs discovery costs 
 
89 LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 37. 
90 Id.  This estimate was 0.1% at the tenth percentile and eighty percent at the ninety-
fifth percentile.  Id.  Nearly ten percent of plaintiffs’ attorneys estimated discovery as zero 
percent of total cost.  Id. 
91 Id. at 38.  This estimate was five percent at the tenth percentile and eighty percent at 
the ninety-fifth percentile.  Id.  Almost five percent of defendants’ attorneys estimated 
discovery as zero percent of total cost.  Id. 
92 See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil 
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 571–75 (2010) (articulating concerns that costs of 
discovery vastly outweigh benefits, that cases settle under pressure from discovery costs 
unrelated to stakes and merits of case, and that discovery costs are increasing 
disproportionately); Koeltl, supra note 55, at 538. 
93 The figures for stakes, as for costs, in the 2009 FJC study rely on attorney estimates 
of the stakes in the closed case.  While an imperfect mechanism for assessing stakes, this 
method avoids problematic assessments of stakes tied to damages requests in pleadings or 
other contexts in which the figures might have very little relation to the strength of the 
claim.  It seems reasonable to presume that an attorney’s estimate of stakes in a given case 
would take into account the attorney’s assessment of the strength of the claims. 
94 LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 42. 
95 Id. 
96 Indeed, as Lee and Willging explain: 
[L]arge percentages of practitioners agree that “[l]itigation is too expensive.”  
But it is difficult to know what one is supposed to make of this finding.  In one 
sense, litigation is almost always too expensive.  It would often be less expensive 
to not have the dispute in the first place, or, barring that, less costly to find a way 
to resolve the dispute without recourse to the courts. 
Lee & Willging, supra note 86, at 769. 
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should represent.97  “Surprisingly,” the study authors write, “the 
median estimates of discovery costs to total litigation costs provided 
by survey respondents were lower than the median responses to the 
normative question.”98  Whereas the median estimates of actual 
discovery costs to total litigation costs were twenty percent by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and twenty-seven percent by defendants’ 
attorneys, the median normative assessments were thirty-three percent 
and forty percent, respectively.99 
The fact that the study’s estimates of cost are lower than the cost 
narrative’s conventional wisdom would predict is especially worth 
exploring given the study’s careful design.  The study was designed to 
capture information about contemporary discovery practice and cost.  
In this context, nondiscovery cases tell us little of use, whereas cases 
of greater duration or complexity promise to provide a richer 
discovery picture.  As a result, the study is designed, if anything, to 
overestimate discovery volume and cost.  Moreover, asking attorneys 
about the attributes of a recent case in which they were involved goes 
some way to overcoming the problems of the attorney opinion 
surveys that abound.  By asking specifically about a recently closed 
case, the 2009 FJC study was able to focus attorney attention to an 
actual case, leaving them less reliant on conventional wisdom and 
availability bias.100 
 
97 LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 105. 
98 Id. at 40. 
99 Id. 
100 While the 2009 FJC study methodology usefully highlights the lack of empirical 
support for the cost-and-delay narrative, other aspects of the study design may reflect its 
focus on concerns animated by the cost narrative itself.  That is, because it seeks to 
measure the cost-and-delay problem, with a special focus on the discovery context, the 
questions asked and the frame provided ignore other significant complaints about the 
federal procedural system.  Some plaintiffs’ attorney comments appended to the study 
suggest other areas that might have been explored, such as discovery delays and discovery 
avoidance, limitations on number and length of depositions, information asymmetries, 
expanding disclosure obligations, and the delay in starting discovery until the Rule 16 
conference, to name a few.  Some illustrative comments follow: 
 “The current restrictions on discovery (e.g., number of depositions, 7 hr depositions) are 
skewed in favor of defendants.  The cost of litigation in federal court is NOT unduly 
increased by discovery.”  Id. at 115.  “[T]he biggest issue is disproportionate resources 
(both legal and economic) when I bring meritorious claims against large multi-national 
entities. . . . [A] recognition of the parties’ relative financial resources would be 
appreciated, particularly when dealing with discovery delays.”  Id. at 119.  “This was a 
difficult survey to complete given that my clients are primarily individual employees that 
sue for discrimination or other civil rights violations.”  Id. at 138.  “I represent plaintiffs, 
who are generally low income, in civil rights litigation.  The major stumbling block to 
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That the closed-case study methodology goes some way to 
alleviating the flaws of attorney opinion surveys is suggested by some 
of the findings of the 2009 FJC study itself.  The normative 
assessments of discovery as a percentage of total cost are one 
example of this phenomenon.  When asked to reflect in the abstract 
on the right amount of discovery cost for a “typical case,” 
respondents’ estimates increase as compared to their actual 
experience with the closed case that was the subject of the study.101  
In the “typical case,” the attorney falls back on the “common-sense” 
narrative of cost and delay.  This benefit was also apparent in 
responses to questions concerning the point of the case at which 
attorneys believed issues are narrowed and framed for resolution.  
When asked about the closed case that the attorney had just 
completed litigating, 34.0% of plaintiffs’ attorneys and 20.4% of 
defendants’ attorneys responded that this focus occurred at the initial 
complaint.102  In contrast, when asked about the “typical case,” the 
initial complaint was selected by just 10.1% of plaintiffs’ attorneys 
and 3.9% of defendants’ attorneys.103 
The 2009 FJC study authors, Emery Lee and Thomas Willging, 
prepared a multivariate analysis of the factors associated with 
 
resolution of my cases is the failure of defendants to provide much that is useful in their 
Answers and Initial Disclosures.  Not until we have gone through several rounds of 
discovery, motions to compel production and depositions do they get serious about 
settlement.”  Id.  “In employment litigation the plaintiff is always disadvantaged in 
discovery.  The defense has all the information and control of most of the witnesses.  
Early, mandatory, comprehensive disclosure would serve to begin to even the playing 
field.”  Id.  “Limiting discovery in employment discrimination cases makes it even more 
difficult for plaintiffs to prove their cases, since they have to prove what a decision maker 
was thinking when he made the challenged decision.  The proof is almost always 
exclusively in the possession of the defendant.”  Id.  “Many of the questions were not 
relevant to my practice because I engage in civil rights litigation under Titles II and III of 
the ADA, which have fee and cost shifting provisions.  My clients never pay for costs or 
fees.  My recovery of my fees and costs comes from the defendants.”  Id.  “The survey 
seems to be at least, in part, written to assist the big corporation try to limit their exposure 
in discovery and e-discovery.  I believe the rules in Federal Court are already much more 
strict than in State Court and do not need to be amended.  The system works well and 
should not be changed.  If anything, Federal Courts could relax their standards a little.  
Less discovery would allow more defendants to avoid liability.”  Id. at 142.  “Generally, I 
found this survey to be biased—in a clear way—to encourage responses that would 
support greater limits and more cost sharing of discovery cost, which in turn 
disproportionately would adversely impact plaintiffs.”  Id. 
101 Id. at 40. 
102 Id. at 45. 
103 Id. at 46. 
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litigation costs as reported in the study.104  This analysis found nine 
traits that were associated with higher litigation costs for both 
plaintiffs and defendants, even after controlling for other factors.105  
However, while the analysis showed that a number of variables 
influenced cost,106 Lee and Willging found that “the stakes in the 
litigation are, empirically, the best predictor of costs.”107  Variation in 
stakes explains almost thirty-seven percent of variation in reported 
costs for plaintiffs and almost forty-seven percent of the variation in 
reported costs for defendants.108  Lee and Willging explain that “if 
the monetary stakes in a case double, all else being equal, the costs 
increase by 25 percent.”109 
In the plaintiff model of the multivariate analysis, most of the 
hypotheses were supported by the results.110  Higher-stakes cases and 
cases with longer processing times were associated with higher costs 
for plaintiffs.111  Electronic discovery was associated with higher 
costs for parties requesting ESI, even after controlling for other 
 
104 LEE & WILLGING, supra note 87.  There are several methodological points that bear 
noting: (1) Lee and Willging create two separate model estimates because they believe 
there are good reasons to suspect differences in costs depending on whether a party is a 
plaintiff or defendant, (2) the large sample size allowed for two separate models with large 
numbers of explanatory variables, (3) the analysis tested nineteen hypotheses, and (4) the 
models included controls for nature-of-suit categories common in the sampled cases such 
as contracts, torts, civil rights, consumer credit, labor, and intellectual property.  Id. at 1–3.  
The baseline estimates for the models were for the roughly ten percent of sampled cases 
that did not fall into those six categories of cases.  The fifth point worth noting is that there 
was also a variable included to capture each district’s judicial workload, as well as controls 
for circuit-level differences in cost.  Id. at 3. 
105 Id. at 1.  The nine traits are: (1) higher monetary stakes in the underlying litigation, 
(2) longer periods of time from filing to disposition, (3) trial dispositions, (4) electronic 
discovery requests from both plaintiff and defendant in the case, (5) disputes over 
electronic discovery, (6) greater case complexity, (7) summary judgment practice, (8) 
concern over the nonmonetary stakes in the underlying litigation, and (9) and 
representation by larger law firms.  Id.  There were also factors that explained variation in 
cases represented by plaintiffs.  Id.  These included the number of expert depositions taken 
and hourly billing.  Id.  Other factors explained variation in defendants’ attorney 
responses, including the number of types of discovery reported and contentiousness 
between the parties.  Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Lee & Willging, supra note 86, at 768. 
108 Id. at 771. 
109 Id. at 771–72. 
110 LEE & WILLGING, supra note 87, at 5.  The plaintiff model was statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level and explained approximately sixty-two percent of the 
variation in the dependent variable.  Id. 
111 Id. 
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factors, and costs were higher for parties who not only requested but 
also produced ESI.112  Similarly, most of the hypotheses were 
supported by the results in the defendant model.113  Here, too, higher 
stakes and longer processing times were associated with higher costs 
and increased factual complexity.114  Unsurprisingly, when a case 
was terminated through trial, it also tended to have higher costs, 
around twenty-four percent higher than cases not ending in trial, all 
other factors being equal.115  A ruling on summary judgment 
increased defendants’ reported costs by approximately twenty-two 
percent, controlling for other factors.116  While defendants’ costs 
were higher by about seventeen percent in cases in which the 
defendant was both requested to produce and produced ESI, this was 
not the case when the defendant was a requesting-only or producing-
only party.117 
The multivariate analysis also identifies cost drivers that do not fit 
into our customary understanding of cost and delay in the federal 
courts and are not typically the focus of reform efforts.  The 
multivariate analysis found that, for both plaintiff and defendant 
models, the importance of non-monetary stakes to the client increased 
costs substantially, all else being equal.118  In addition, the structure 
of attorney representation affects costs.  The analysis showed that 
larger firms tended to have higher costs, even when controlling for 
other factors.119  When an attorney worked in a firm with five 
hundred attorneys or more, costs were more than double those of a 
solo practitioner.120  For plaintiffs’ attorneys at large firms, costs 
were 109% higher; for defendants’ attorneys, these costs were 156% 
 
112 Id. 
113 See id. at 7–8.  The defendant model was statistically significant at the 0.001 level 
and explained approximately seventy-six percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable.  Id. at 7. 
114 Id.  “A 1% increase in stakes was associated with a 0.25% increase in reported costs.  
. . .  A 1% increase in case duration was associated with a 0.26% increase in costs, all else 
equal.”  Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 8. 
117 Id. at 7 (“Thus, one cannot conclude that these parties had higher costs than parties 
in non-ESI cases, once factors such as case complexity, firm size, and stakes, among 
others, are controlled for.”). 
118 Id. at 6, 8.  For plaintiffs, costs increased by about forty-two percent.  Id. at 6.  For 
defendants, the increase was twenty-five percent.  Id. at 8. 
119 Id. at 6, 8. 
120 Id. at 6.  The number of plaintiffs’ attorneys reporting that they used hourly billing 
was almost one out of every three.  Id. 
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higher.121  In addition, hourly billing was associated with higher costs 
(by roughly twenty-five percent) for plaintiffs’ attorneys.122  Coupled 
with the study’s other findings, these variations call into question not 
only the assumptions of the cost narrative but also the items targeted 
for procedural reform.123 
B.  Prior Empirical Studies 
Although the 2009 FJC study stood in contrast to most of the 
surveys presented at the Duke Conference, what makes it truly 
remarkable, from the perspective of the cost narrative, is how 
unremarkable it actually is.  Nearly every effort to quantify litigation 
costs and to understand discovery practice over the last four decades 
has reached results similar to the 2009 FJC study.124  Empirical 
studies have repeatedly failed to document exorbitant costs or 
widespread discovery abuse; they have generally found the volume of 
discovery, the costs of discovery, and the total costs of litigation to be 
less than expected.  Both discovery costs and total cost have been 
found to relate to stakes, case complexity, and duration. 
Since the early 1960s, those engaged in rule reform have sought 
out empirical data to help guide their efforts.  In response to rising 
concerns about discovery and the potential for abuse, the Advisory 
Committee commissioned the Columbia Project for Effective Justice 
(Columbia Project) to develop data that would assist in crafting civil 
procedural reform.125  The Columbia Project was one of the first and 
perhaps most comprehensive evaluations of discovery, and it 
concluded that the broad discovery regime enabled by the 1938 Rules 
did not create severe or common problems.126  The Columbia Project 
found that discovery costs were not excessive but rather tied to the 
 
121 Id. at 6, 8. 
122 Id. at 6.  This correlation was not found in the defendant model, perhaps because 
there is such limited information of defendants’ attorneys engaging in alternatives to 
hourly billing.  See id. at 8.  In the 2010 FJC study, fewer than five percent of defendants’ 
attorneys reported using an alternative billing method.  See id. 
123 See generally Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
2073 (2002) (arguing that procedural rules are not a source of litigation costs). 
124 See supra Part II.A; infra Part II.B. 
125 For a full discussion of the findings of the Columbia Project, see GLASER, supra 
note 17. 
126 See id. at 160–61, 185–87. 
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stakes in the case.127  Attorneys, it found, were less likely to engage 
in discovery if the predicted recovery was low (at that time, under 
$2500), and very likely to engage in discovery if the predicted 
outcome was high (at that time, more than $40,000).128  No 
fundamental changes to the structure of discovery were made as part 
of the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules, largely because the 
Columbia Project revealed that “[t]he costs of discovery do not appear 
to be oppressive, as a general matter, either in relation to ability to 
pay or to the stakes of the litigation.”129 
The 1978 FJC discovery study made similar findings.  The study 
found both occurrence of discovery and overall discovery volume to 
be lower than expected.130  There was no formal discovery at all 
reported in approximately fifty-two percent of the cases reviewed by 
the 1978 study.131  When discovery was taken, it tended not to be 
voluminous.  In fewer than five percent of cases examined were there 
 
127 See id. at 186–87. 
128 See id at 56.  Whereas two-thirds of attorneys who predicted recovery of less than 
$2500 engaged in discovery, seventy-five percent of those predicting recovery between 
$2500 and $40,000 did, and ninety-two percent of attorneys predicting recovery over 
$40,000 did so.  Id. 
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (1970) (“The Columbia Survey 
concludes, in general, that there is no empirical evidence to warrant a fundamental change 
in the philosophy of the discovery rules.  No widespread or profound failings are disclosed 
in the scope or availability of discovery.”). 
130 PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE 
CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978).  It seems likely that the use of discovery 
is higher today than it was in 1978.  The 2009 FJC study found that over eighty percent of 
survey respondents reported the use of some form of discovery, although the sample in the 
2009 study was specifically designed to identify cases that would involve discovery 
activity.  LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 1.  Other changes in discovery practice lend 
credence to the presumption that today’s discovery incidence might be higher.  For 
example, in the 1978 study, depositions were the most frequently used discovery device, 
CONNOLLY ET AL., supra, at 28, whereas today, document requests are the most common.  
See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 8 fig.2.  However, comparisons remain difficult.  
We have no recent study that is comparable to the 1978 FJC discovery project, both in the 
sample utilized and in the 1978 study’s review of case files and docket sheets to create a 
detailed database based not simply on attorney reports of the sample cases.  As two 
researchers who have studied empirical questions related to discovery explain, “A 
sampling strategy designed to create a rich source of information about discovery by 
uncovering high-discovery or problem-discovery cases is suitable for much discovery 
research, but does not provide a solid basis for estimating discovery incidence rates for 
civil litigation as a whole.”  Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical 
Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 791 (1998). 
131 CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 130, at 28. 
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more than ten requests for discovery.132  Moreover, though reports of 
abuse were rare, motions for sanctions tended to be granted when 
filed.133  Study authors also found that there were identifiable factors 
affecting the amount of discovery, including proxies for case 
complexity such as the number of parties involved and the presence 
of cross and counterclaims.134  Amount in controversy was also found 
to affect the amount of discovery.135  Once again, based on the 
findings of the 1978 FJC discovery study, the Advisory Committee 
decided not to move forward with broad discovery reforms that had 
been proposed by the ABA, finding them to be unwarranted based on 
the data.136 
Studies from the 1990s were surprisingly consistent with the data 
from the 1960s and 1970s.  Indeed, authors of the 1997 FJC study 
write, 
 Empirical research about discovery in civil litigation has yielded 
results that differ from the conventional wisdom, which claims that 
discovery is abusive, time-consuming, unproductive, and too costly.  
In contrast to this picture of discovery, empirical research over the 
last three decades has shown consistently that voluminous discovery 
tends to be related to case characteristics such as complexity and 
case type, that the typical case has relatively little discovery, 
conducted at costs that are proportionate to the stakes of the 
litigation, and that discovery generally—but with notable 
 
132 See id.  It should be acknowledged, however, that volume of discovery is hard to 
capture.  One can easily envision a single request for discovery that is onerous and 
requires production of vast amounts of documents.  Even more difficult is determining the 
quality of the discovery and its appropriateness to the case.  For a detailed exploration of 
the challenges facing any effort to study discovery abuse empirically, see Mullenix, 
Discovery in Disarray, supra note 28. 
133 See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 130, at 19–20. 
134 Id. at 40. 
135 Id.  The 1978 study found amount in controversy was a weaker identifier of the 
amount of discovery.  Id.  This may be because amount in controversy is a less reliable 
indicator of the stakes in a case than attorney estimates of stakes.  Compare id. at 50–51, 
with Lee & Willging, supra note 86, at 771–72, and GLASER, supra note 17, at 56–57.  
The 1978 study suggests this same limitation: “Apparently, the amount claimed by the 
plaintiff in the complaint bears little relationship to the actual value of the case.”  
CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 130, at 51. 
136 The Advisory Committee considered proposals aimed at eliminating abuse that 
included changes to the scope of discovery and limitations on interrogatories.  However, 
citing the 1978 FJC discovery study, the committee note states, “There has been 
widespread criticism of abuse of discovery. . . .  The Committee believes that abuse of 
discovery, while very serious in certain cases, is not so general as to require such basic 
changes in the rules that govern discovery in all cases.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory 
committee’s note (discussing amendments to Rule 26). 
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exceptions—yields information that aids in the just disposition of 
cases.137 
The 1997 FJC study surveyed the attorneys of record in federal 
cases that had closed in the final quarter of 1996.138  As with the 
FJC’s study a decade later, median total costs and expenditures on 
discovery appeared to be much lower than the expectations of the 
bench and bar, and both appeared to be far more proportional to both 
cost and litigants’ ability to pay.139  The 1997 FJC results indicated 
that the median total cost of litigation, including attorneys’ fees, was 
approximately $13,000 per client.140  This total cost was associated 
most strongly with the monetary stakes in the litigation.141  However, 
costs were also found to increase as each of a number of factors 
increased, including the size of the law firm handling the case, the 
complexity of the case, and the level of contentiousness of the 
dispute.142  Finally, discovery expenses were found to be low relative 
to the stakes in the litigation.  The median estimate was that discovery 
costs amounted to three percent of the stakes.143 
Given that procedural reform has repeatedly targeted discovery 
with the aim of curtailing litigation costs,144 empirical studies have 
 
137 Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice 
Under the 1993 Federal Rules Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998) (footnotes 
omitted); see also THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND 
DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 52 (1997) [hereinafter 
WILLGING ET AL., DISCOVERY & DISCLOSURE PRACTICE] (discussing how the extent of 
discovery and discovery-related problems are likely related to the size of the case and 
various other case characteristics). 
138 WILLGING ET AL., DISCOVERY & DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, supra note 137, at 1, 57.  
The study’s design resembles that of the 2009 FJC study.  For comparative purposes, the 
FJC sought to parallel parts of the 2009 study to those of the 1997 study.  See LEE & 
WILLGING, supra note 6, at 5 n.3. 
139 See WILLGING ET AL., DISCOVERY & DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, supra note 137, at 
14–15. 
140 Id. at 14.  This includes all costs incurred through the attorney, including fees, 
transcript costs, costs associated with expert witnesses, and so forth.  Id. It does not 
include any expenses incurred by the client separately. 
141 Id. at 16–17. 
142 Id. at 54. 
143 Id. at 16.  At the ninety-fifth percentile, this figure was thirty-two percent.  Id. at 17 
tbl.6.  Not only did discovery expenditures appear reasonable in relation to stakes but also 
more attorneys thought that discovery expenses were low relative to the stakes (twenty 
percent) than found them to be too high (fifteen percent).  Id. at 18 tbl.8.  Roughly half of 
the attorneys thought that discovery costs were “right” relative to the stakes.  Id. 
144 See Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, supra note 28, at 
386. 
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sought to estimate discovery’s contribution to the total cost of 
litigation.  Each report supports the conclusion that discovery costs 
themselves are exaggerated and calls into question the utility of 
reform efforts targeting discovery.  The 1997 FJC study lends greatest 
credence to the concerns over discovery expense, estimating 
discovery costs at nearly fifty percent of total litigation cost.145  All 
other studies have found discovery costs to be a much smaller share 
of litigation expense.  From the Columbia Project’s estimates of 
discovery accounting for nineteen to thirty-six percent of litigation 
costs,146 to a Rand study finding that lawyer work hours on discovery 
comprise zero to thirty-eight hours of total attorney work hours for 
general civil cases,147 the empirical data find discovery costs to 
represent a much smaller percentage of total litigation expenses than 
imagined by the public or estimated by experienced attorneys.148  The 
2009 FJC study found median estimates of discovery at twenty 
percent of total costs for plaintiffs and twenty-seven percent of total 
costs for defendants.149  Summarizing these four decades of research, 
Emery Lee and Thomas Willging explain that the studies indicate 
“[t]here will be some more discovery-heavy cases, of course, but 20 
to 50 percent [of total litigation cost] is what we would expect in a 
typical case,” and, “perhaps even in the typical major case,” although, 
as Lee and Willging note, the data on such large cases are limited.150  
When these ranges are compared with the dominant descriptions of 
 
145 WILLGING ET AL., DISCOVERY & DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, supra note 137, at 15 
tbl.4. 
146 GLASER, supra note 17, at 180 tbl.43. 
147 JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA (1998), available at http://www.rand.org 
/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/MR941.pdf.  This study concluded that 
“[d]iscovery [was] not a pervasive litigation cost problem for the majority of cases.”  Id. at 
27.  For cases lasting more than 270 days, RAND found post-filing discovery accounted 
for thirty-six percent of attorney work hours.  Id. at xxi tbl.S.2.  RAND used attorney work 
hours as a proxy for cost because they found calculation of litigation costs across different 
attorneys’ fee structures was too difficult.  Id. at xvii. 
148 Compare this twenty-to-fifty-percent range to the median estimates of seventy 
percent reported by the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System.  
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., UNIV. OF DENVER, PRESERVING 
ACCESS AND IDENTIFYING EXCESS: AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AND CONSENSUS IN THE 
2010 CONFERENCE MATERIALS 5 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts 
/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/IAALS,%20Preserving%20Access 
%20and%20Identifying%20Excess.pdf. 
149 LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 38 tbl.6, 39 tbl.7. 
150 Lee & Willging, supra note 86, at 781. 
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discovery costs found in attorney surveys,151 judicial opinions,152 and 
public discourse,153 it becomes clear that the cost narrative is out of 
touch with the empirical data.  Coming to grips with why this may be 
is the aim of the following Part. 
III 
EXPLAINING THE RESILIENCE OF THE COST-AND-DELAY NARRATIVE 
As the preceding Parts describe, there exists a major gap between 
the vision of civil justice presented by the cost-and-delay narrative 
and that outlined by existing empirical studies.  This inconsistency 
demands attention, not only because reform of civil procedure has 
long been marching to the beat of the cost-and-delay drum, but also 
because attempting to explain the discrepancy enables us to identify 
other failings of the civil justice system.  The benefits to be gained for 
reform efforts are two-fold.  These can avoid implementing changes 
on the basis of cost-and-delay assumptions that may not, in fact, be 
true; recognizing the unsubstantiated nature of the cost-and-delay 
narrative should help to improve the quality of reform proposals.  
Moreover, because the cost-and delay narrative enables the national 
debate to elide other weaknesses of the civil system, it is unable to 
address these underlying sources of dissatisfaction.  Through careful 
examination of the cost-and-delay narrative’s resilience, we develop a 
better understanding of the other sources of dissatisfaction with civil 
justice that have helped to create a receptive audience for the 
narrative.  Thus far, understanding the narrative’s persuasiveness has 
not been the focus of the literature.  However, some suggestions about 
 
151 See, e.g., NAT’L EMP’T LAWYERS ASS’N, SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF NELA MEMBERS 34 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library 
/NELA,%20Summary%20of%20Results%20of%20FJC%20Survey%20of%20NELA 
%20Members.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL 
PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT 98 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts 
/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/ABA%20Section%20of 
%20Litigation,%20Survey%20on%20Civil%20Practice.pdf.  In both surveys, attorneys’ 
median estimate for the percentage of costs incurred in connection with discovery was 
seventy percent.  Notably, responding to a question about what percentage of costs should 
be incurred in discovery, attorneys’ median estimate was fifty percent. 
152 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (relying on an 
Advisory Committee memorandum reporting that “discovery accounts for as much as 90 
percent of litigation costs” in support of need to factor in potential discovery expense 
when considering dismissal of antitrust complaint). 
153 Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note 28, at 1401–02 (detailing politicians’ 
and journalists’ statements that discovery amounted to eighty percent of litigation costs). 
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causality are worthy of closer consideration.154  Here, I identify three 
common themes arising in the cost-and-delay literature that provide a 
foundation for further examination into this question.  The first relies 
on cultural and psychological factors to explain the dissemination of 
the narrative.  These factors include widespread media distortion of 
legal stories and the way that cognitive bias works to amplify 
elements of the cost narrative.  The second strand identifies 
sociological factors that support the narrative.  Here, specifically, 
scholars point to the interest of the defense bar in propagating the 
narrative and the broader interests that professionals develop in 
intensifying the belief that litigation costs are high.  I also discuss 
how the hierarchical structure of the legal profession contributes to 
the persuasiveness of the cost-and-delay narrative among influential 
members of the bar.  The final explanatory theme turns to political 
and historical developments to account for the success of the cost-
and-delay narrative.  This strand describes how the narrative is bound 
up in certain political battles over what role law should play in 
society: a backlash to the expansion of rights, remedies, and 
discovery; the political struggle over the extent to which laws will be 
enforced; the question of what the legal system can achieve through 
the courts; and the extent to which the appropriate cost of litigation is 
a political—nonempirical—concern that implicates the very purpose 
and function of the legal system. 
A.  Cultural and Psychological Factors 
Among the factors most often cited to explain the strength of the 
cost narrative is the role that the media plays, both by uncritically 
transmitting claims about excess cost and delay and by privileging 
remarkable stories.  Unsurprisingly, large jury verdicts tend to garner 
media attention, whereas smaller verdicts or appellate review of large 
verdicts get less coverage, if any at all.155  Less predictably, studies 
 
154 The scholar most often associated with examining this discrepancy is Mark 
Galanter, a long-time chronicler of the ways in which popular ideas about the legal system, 
such as the “litigation explosion” and American litigiousness, persist in the face of careful 
empirical refutation by Galanter himself and many of his colleagues.  The discovery 
reforms of the 1990s brought additional scholarly attention to the peculiarly powerful cost-
and-delay narrative in the works of Linda Mullenix, Elizabeth Thornburg, and Jeffrey 
Stempel, among others. 
155 See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil 
Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 744–47 (1998).  Galanter discusses Oscar Chase’s 
analysis of how The New York Times and New York Newsday covered personal injury jury 
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have found that media overreport on certain types of cases, such as 
medical malpractice and product liability cases.  One study found that 
though these types of cases comprised only eleven percent of tort 
filings and led to thirteen percent of tort trials, they made up seventy-
four percent of the cases reported on.156  Newspapers have also been 
found to report a much higher proportion of verdicts in favor of 
plaintiffs than those in favor of defendants.157 
Linda Mullenix has carefully documented the media’s role in 
fanning the flames of the cost-and-delay narrative during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, in advance of the CJRA’s passage.  She 
demonstrates how unsubstantiated claims about the cost of discovery 
and level of litigiousness were repeated without verification by 
nationally syndicated columnists in the run up to the CJRA legislative 
effort.158  Similarly, media coverage of sensational lawsuit stories has 
lent credence to the idea that Americans are unusually litigious.  
Mullenix opines, “We believe America is the most litigious society on 
earth not because this is true, but because the media have told us so 
over and over again. . . .  We believe American civil litigation is out 
of hand because notoriously greedy lawyers engage in serious 
discovery abuse—not because they do, but because litigiousness has 
become linked in our minds with discovery abuse.”159 
 
awards.  Id. at 745.  Chase compared the awards covered in the two newspapers with the 
awards reported in the New York Jury Verdict Reporter over a six-year period.  Id. at 745.  
The average awards reported by the newspapers ranged from 6 to 17.2 times as large as the 
average awards recorded in the Reporter.  Id. 
156 See id. at 744. 
157 Id. at 746 (“[A] verdict for the plaintiff is twelve times more likely to be reported 
than is a defense verdict.  An award of punitive damages rachets up the coverage disparity 
even further.”). 
158 Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note 28, at 1402–03.  The statistics parroted 
from then-Vice President Daniel Quayle’s address to the American Bar Association 
included claims that seventy percent of the lawyers in the world lived in the United States, 
that Americans file eighteen million new lawsuits per year, and that seventy-seven percent 
of lawyers admit to abusing discovery.  Id.  These were not substantiated.  See id. at 1441–
42. 
159 Id. at 1395–96.  Another image disseminated by media coverage is that of the 
unethical and rapacious attorney.  It is a character that plays a pivotal role in the cost-and-
delay narrative.  The narrative trades in caricature of the venal lawyer.  There are too many 
cases filed because lawyers file baseless claims in pursuit of their own financial gain.  
Discovery abuse is rampant because lawyers use it to rack up fees against clients.  The 
system cannot be trusted to self regulate because that would require the ethical conduct of 
lawyers within the system.  The “widespread distrust of lawyers . . . lend[s] credence” to 
the cost narrative.  Id. at 1409.  Galanter quotes a Republican political operative providing 
this advice: “Unlike most complex issues, the problems in our civil justice system come 
with a ready made villain: the lawyer. . . . It’s almost impossible to go too far when it 
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Yet the question remains, why do the media cover litigation this 
way?  The media do not have an independent interest in questions of 
cost and delay that would clearly bias them toward one view of civil 
justice reform over another.  Nonetheless, the civil justice story that 
emerges from media reporting supports the account of cost and delay.  
Important work has been done to show how media coverage 
misrepresents the way the civil justice system functions.  With this 
established, the question that must now be explored is why this is so.  
In order to fully understand the media’s role, and to begin to make 
sense of the cost-and-delay narrative, it is necessary to explore more 
fully the context in which the media operates. 
There remains a corresponding question: what makes the media’s 
story resonate with the population?  The public is not simply a passive 
audience that absorbs and accepts whatever story the media tells.  
Marc Galanter suggests that a more nuanced view of the audience 
may lie in psychological research on cognitive bias.160  Lessons from 
cognitive psychology tell us that the brain is ill-suited to make use of 
data of certain kinds and in certain contexts.161  The tendency to 
ignore relevant information about baseline frequencies and, 
consequently, to poorly gauge the representativeness of the data is 
relevant to assessing the cost-and-delay narrative.  The frequency of 
widely discussed or publicized events may be overestimated.  
Confirmation bias—that is, the increased receptiveness to evidence 
that confirms what we already believe or think we know—leads to 
exaggerated certainty as to the accuracy of one’s knowledge.  
Galanter explains, “In other words, the way our minds are built 
inclines us to think that we know more than we do.”162  As a result, 
lawyers and businessmen may be highly confident about their own 
estimates of litigation frequency, cost, duration, and the nature of 
discovery, even though these assessments may be wrought with 
 
comes to demonizing lawyers. . . .  Make the lawyer your villain by contrasting him with 
the ‘little guy,’ the innocent, hard-working American who he takes to the cleaners.”  
Galanter, supra note 155, at 748 (quoting THE LUNTZ RESEARCH COS., LANGUAGE OF 
THE 21ST CENTURY 128 (1997)).  Similar to claims of media distortion, explanations that 
rely on a negative view of lawyers also leave us wondering why that negative view of 
lawyers persists.  While it is true that the cost-and-delay narrative plays on the nation’s 
dim view of lawyers, it is unclear from where this distaste for lawyers arose. 
160 Id. at 743–44. 
161 See id. 
162 Id. at 744. 
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cognitive biases that make them inaccurate.163  Galanter posits that 
the interpretive effort required to assess liability risks “is a complex 
interpretive undertaking ideally suited for the appearance of the kinds 
of flawed intuitive judgment described in the cognitive psychology 
literature.”164 
The psychological explanation, however, rests on some under-
investigated assumptions.  Why does the cost-and-delay narrative 
come to prominence when it does, and in the form that it takes?  
Would not our cognitive tendencies create the same pressures in the 
first three decades of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as in 
subsequent decades?  Some cognitive biases, such as confirmation 
bias, are psychological tendencies, but they do not suggest a 
necessary content.  In this context, confirmation bias would suggest 
that individuals are more attentive to information that supports the 
existing belief of the civil justice system as crippled by cost and 
delay.  The cognitive bias does not itself explain why existing 
knowledge of civil justice is concerned with cost and delay.  What 
accounts for the existence and strength of those beliefs?  
Understanding the context in which cognitive bias operates is crucial.  
I believe that the political and historical factors described in this Part 
shed some light on these questions and can supply that context. 
Almost every account that attempts to refute the cost-and-delay 
narrative draws attention to the lack of empirical information 
supporting it and the lack of empirical study that could facilitate 
informed decision making about the civil justice system.  Much of 
this discussion emphasizes that we have a scarcity of studies 
providing hard data.165  Galanter attributes this in part to a legal 
 
163 Galanter explains that the overconfidence in handicapping litigation frequency, cost, 
and size has been documented in empirical work undertaken by Theodore Eisenberg and 
Steward Schwab.  “In contrast to the widespread perception of ‘numerous successful 
constitutional tort cases imposing massive monetary costs on state and local governments,’ 
[they] find ‘relatively fewer cases, meeting with poor success and having a modest fiscal 
impact.’”  Id. (quoting Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes 
Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 530 (1989)).  
Eisenberg and Schwab provide that the error in perception results when individuals 
generalize from the pool of visible cases, available through published opinions, to the 
much larger pool of unobserved cases.  Id.  High-profile constitutional tort cases thus have 
disproportionate impact on evaluations of how constitutional tort litigation impacts the 
system on the whole. 
164 Id. 
165 Much of the research that is relied on consists of opinion surveys rather than actual 
empirical study.  See discussion supra Part I.  Discussing the litigation crisis and its 
relationship to the change in interpretation of Rule 56, Miller writes, 
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culture “uninterested in aggregates and empirical verification.”166  
There is not sufficient political will to invest in the collection of data 
that would be required to accumulate what he calls “a fund of 
systematic social knowledge about the working of the civil justice 
system.”167  In a similar vein, Mullenix asserts that “[n]o group or 
institution commissioned case-based empirical research into federal 
court discovery.”168  Mullenix argues that “soft social science 
methodologies” help to buttress what she terms “the myth of 
discovery abuse.”169  Lacking the systematic knowledge of how civil 
justice operates, we are free to substitute our own hunches and 
impressions and make room for the persuasive force of the cost-and-
delay narrative.170 
Furthermore, important architects of the civil rules have drawn 
attention to the fact that much of the information that would be 
helpful in assessing the truth of the cost-and-delay narrative, or the 
effects of proposed reforms, is not susceptible to empirical study.  
Miller describes the challenges of determining the impact that 
changes to the pleading standard have on the system as a whole.  
While studies are under way to evaluate the effect, if any, that 
heightened pleading standards are having on the rate of dismissal, 
Miller asks, how do we count the cases that are not brought due to the 
 
[A] meaningful debate, however, requires empirical evidence to evaluate the 
direct and indirect effects of enhancing the Rule 56 procedure.  This need is all 
the more urgent given that the efficiency gains offered to justify promoting use of 
summary judgment may be offset by negative effects on other system values, 
such as accuracy, fairness, the day-in-court principle, and the jury trial right. 
Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1048 (2003). 
 Paul Carrington explains that there was “a manifest shortage of data to resolve 
conflicting observations bearing on the feasibility of [procedural reform] proposals.”  Paul 
D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 
DUKE L.J. 597, 625 (2010). 
166 Galanter, supra note 155, at 741 (footnote omitted). 
167 Id. at 740. 
168 Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note 28, at 1432. 
169 Id. at 1410.  Additionally, she states: “The civil justice reform movement proceeded 
without the benefit of any empirical study designed to determine whether discovery abuse 
actually was a problem in federal civil litigation.”  Id. at 1432. 
170 Galanter highlights the knowledge gap, because he finds it gives force to the 
litigation crisis narrative: “[T]he experiential gap is filled not by systematic data, but by 
gleanings from the media.”  Galanter, supra note 155, at 743. 
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change in standard?171  Even less susceptible to measurement would 
be gaining any sense of the quality of the claims that are dismissed—
that is, how many meritorious claims will be filtered out due to the 
new pleading standards.172 
Mullenix argues for the development of “sound empirical 
investigation” in order to counteract the “surveys, . . . anecdotes, and 
war stories” that ignore empirical evidence and rely instead on the 
accepted cost-and-delay narrative.173  She describes some of the best 
empirical investigations of discovery issues but concludes that these 
studies underscore the difficulty of providing more than a measure of 
the quantity of discovery activity.174  Researchers have had little 
success developing qualitative assessments of discovery practice.175  
Although Mullenix presents these challenges of “qualitative 
assessment” as methodological difficulties, I believe they actually 
point to a more significant difficulty at the heart of civil procedural 
debates.  The very questions implicated by the cost-and-delay 
narrative—that is, whether civil justice is worth the burdens that it 
entails—are not questions susceptible to empirical verification.  This 
limitation helps to explain the persuasiveness of the cost-and-delay 
narrative in the face of empirical data that seems to contradict it. 
As Miller has explained, our studies count the “countable,” but 
they cannot speak, of course, to the things that are not measurable.  
Miller has stated this in the context of specific phenomena that may 
not be susceptible to measurement, such as the extent of harm that 
will go unremedied because claims are never brought (in contrast to 
measuring the percentage of motions to dismiss that are granted—that 
is a change that can be measured).176  Implicit in Miller’s observation, 
 
171 Author’s Notes from the 2010 Civil Litigation Conference at the Duke University 
School of Law (May 10–11, 2010) (on file with author). 
172 Id. 
173 Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note 28, at 1432.  Mullenix takes as 
examples of “hard social science,” the 1978 FJC study of civil discovery, discussed supra 
Part II.B; a 1982 FJC study that sought to make qualitative assessments of discovery 
practice as an expansion on the quantitative findings of the 1978 FJC study; and a 1993 
study of civil discovery in the state courts undertaken by the National Center for State 
Courts.  Id. at 1433–42.  Significantly, the 1982 FJC study was never published due to the 
“methodological problems” encountered in its efforts to document the qualitative 
dimensions of discovery practice.  Id. at 1436.  “The Baltimore study demonstrates the 
extreme difficulty of getting beyond anecdotes and opinions, in order to better document 
and assess the reality of discovery abuse.”  Id. at 1440. 
174 See id. at 1434–42. 
175 See id. 
176 See Miller, supra note 72, at 47–49. 
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however, is that whether the civil system is “too costly” is, at base, 
not a question for which empirical inquiry can provide an answer.  
The question is a normative one, requiring that we decide what type 
of civil system we wish to have and what role we want courts to play 
in organizing behavior and, ultimately, in doing justice. 
Thus, while literature on the knowledge gap identifies important 
lacuna in the empirical data, it also helps us to appreciate that the 
underlying concerns of the cost-and-delay narrative cannot be 
answered by empirical study.  To develop the normative response that 
a solution ultimately requires demands that we pay closer attention to 
the historical and political context in which the civil justice system 
operates. 
B.  Sociological Factors 
While media distortion plays a role in most efforts to explain the 
cost-and-delay narrative, by far the most common cause identified is 
the role of interest-group influence.177  Particularly, commentators 
note that repeat defendants are actively involved not only in 
advocating for reforms on the basis of the cost narrative but also in 
underwriting the dissemination of the narrative itself.178  This is 
because procedural changes made in response to the cost narrative are 
widely understood to benefit defendants over plaintiffs, to help limit 
liability and curtail plaintiff access to justice.  The role of business 
groups and insurance interests in proposing and passing reform 
legislation through the CJRA and the 2000 amendments is well 
documented.  Mullenix’s thorough history of the CJRA’s passage 
emphasizes the business ties permeating the studies and activities that 
assisted in creating the legislation.  She identifies how pro-business 
and insurance organizations helped to underwrite surveys that were 
then relied upon by the Brookings-Biden Task Force and the 
subsequent CJRA legislation.179  There, pro-defendant forces were 
overrepresented on the task force itself and were subsequently 
“double counted,” as many of these industry representatives not only 
 
177 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 165, at 609–10; Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, 
supra note 28, at 1396, 1416–25; Stempel, supra note 28, at 552–59. 
178 E.g., Galanter, supra note 155, at 747–48; Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra 
note 28, at 1405–06. 
179 See Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note 28, at 1416–17. 
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served on the task force but also testified at the ensuing congressional 
hearings.180  Mullenix describes the CJRA’s legislative history as 
a masterpiece of dishonesty and disinformation, all pressed into 
service by constituencies using civil justice reform rhetoric to 
secure advantageous procedural rules.  Disingenuously, the CJRA’s 
congressional supporters used survey poll research as evidence of 
facts.  Thus, the legislative history is a stunning illustration of how 
perception and belief were used—at times naively, at times 
cynically—to shoulder the burden of proving the existence of a 
crisis in federal civil litigation.181 
Discussing the 1998 proposed discovery rule changes, Elizabeth 
Thornburg declares, “It is no secret that the anti-discovery pressure 
has come from defendants, especially defendants in product liability, 
securities, and antitrust cases.”182  Thornburg points out that 
discovery reform placing new limits on discovery had been taking 
place since the early 1980s.183  Yet here was the Advisory 
Committee, hot on the heels of the CJRA’s sweeping discovery-
related legislation, proposing a new set of changes that once again 
aimed to curtail discovery.  More discovery reform was on the table 
in 1998, explains Thornburg, because “organized forces have united 
to argue in favor of cutbacks in discovery. . . .  This group consists in 
large part of repeat corporate defendants and their insurers.”184  The 
chair of the Advisory Committee explained that it was renewing its 
examination of discovery “in response to ‘longstanding concerns’ 
about discovery abuse,” and described the “depth of dissatisfaction 
with discovery.”185  Despite these claims of widespread 
dissatisfaction, the Committee heard the opposite from plaintiff-based 
 
180 See id. 
181 Id. at 1420–21. 
182 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the “Haves” a Little More: Considering the 1998 
Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 243 (1999). 
183 See id. at 230. 
184 Id.  Thornburg seems to imply that the Advisory Committee was susceptible to the 
pleas of defense interests in part because of the loyalties of Committee members 
themselves.  Noting that the chair of the Committee, Judge Paul Niemeyer, “made review 
of discovery the highest priority for the Committee,” Thornburg drops a footnote detailing 
Niemeyer’s practice experience at a large “business law firm.”  Id. at 244.  In subsequent 
text and notes, Thornburg points out that Niemeyer willingly recycles the claim that 
discovery constitutes eighty percent of costs, even though he admits that he knows of no 
empirical foundation for the claim, and even though the studies that the Committee 
commissions contradict the premise.  Id. at 245 n.97.  Stempel similarly calls attention to 
the defense-oriented backgrounds of the Advisory Committee.  See Stempel, supra note 
28, at 530. 
185 Thornburg, supra note 182, at 245. 
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advocacy groups, who described discovery abuse as “rare” and 
recommended against further discovery rules changes.186  In contrast, 
defense-oriented organizations (including bar associations and think 
tanks) supported reform in ways that would limit discovery.187  
Thornburg concludes that “[t]he kinds of amendments proposed by 
the Advisory Committee, then, are those sought by groups that tend to 
appear in court as defendants and by their lawyers.”188 
Galanter’s work suggests that the relationship of defense bar 
interests to the cost narrative is deeper than simply encouraging 
legislation in reliance on it.189  Galanter describes the important role 
the “canon of tort horror stories” plays in maintaining and expanding 
a pessimistic view of the legal system in crisis.190  Such horror stories 
are “promoted” by defense-oriented groups such as the American Tort 
Reform Association.191  He explains how litigation “horror stories” 
are “circulated by entrepreneurial publicists through a succession of 
other media. . . .  The focus is on the claimant and the triviality of the 
claim.”192 
However, the cost-and-delay narrative is not supported exclusively 
through deliberate efforts by pro-business organizations.  Several 
aspects of the way the law-related professions are organized 
 
186 Id. 
187 Id.  Both the American College of Trial Lawyers and the Defense Research Institute 
supported the proposed scope limitations.  While advocating that the scope of available 
discovery be narrowed, the Defense Research Institute also recommended that the recently 
instituted automatic disclosure regime be scaled back to a much more limited exchange of 
information.  Id.  A narrower discovery scope was supposed to reduce the prospect of 
“abusive” imposition of cost and delay through discovery, and indeed the ACTL and DRI 
advocated for narrowing the scope of discovery on this basis.  See id.  Nonetheless, DRI 
also sought to unwind the automatic disclosure mechanism even though it was designed to 
lessen cost, delay, and the possibility of abuse.  See id. 
188 Id. at 245–46. 
189 See Galanter, supra note 155, at 740.  Galanter refers to the work of Stephen Daniels 
and Joanne Martin chronicling the investment by business interests in spreading stories 
about problematic litigation and excessive punitive damages awards.  Id.  He writes, 
“Lobbyists, lawyers, pundits, and writers in corporate-sponsored think tanks have poured 
out the bad news about various disorders of the civil justice system, and their message has 
resounded loudly through the trade press and popular media.”  Id.; see also Marc Galanter, 
Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996) (arguing that the 
exaggerated emphasis of the costs of litigation and the level of litigiousness in American 
culture has had the effect of bypassing real problems with the American tort system). 
190 Galanter, supra note 155, at 729. 
191 See id. 
192 Id. at 731. 
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contribute to the robustness of the cost narrative.  As Galanter 
explains, there are many professionals whose very position 
encourages the proliferation of the cost-and-delay narrative.  
Personnel professionals, for example, have strong incentive to 
amplify the threat of liability from wrongful discharge and themselves 
as a necessary protection from the onerous burdens of litigation.193  
Practicing lawyers have similar incentives.  Galanter points also to 
politicians who champion the cost-and-delay narrative because it can 
provide a clear-cut issue on which to be decisive, gain votes, and 
fundraise.194 
Simultaneously, there are structural factors that reinforce the cost-
and-delay narrative.  The structure and hierarchy of the legal 
profession itself lends credence to the cost-and-delay narrative.195  
Because opinion makers in the legal profession disproportionately 
represent large entities in complex litigation, they are most likely 
developing their impressions of the “normal” litigation experience in 
the most extraordinary contexts.  That is, they are most likely to spend 
their time handling high-volume discovery in high-stakes litigation.  
Hence the 2009 FJC study’s median numbers—whether they be for 
total cost, amount of discovery, and proportionality of discovery196—
are unlikely to look anything like the practice experience of these 
attorneys.  This is true whether they come from large or small firms, 
as long as those firms handle complex commercial litigation.  In this 
light it makes sense that, though the 2009 FJC study appears to be in 
 
193 Id. at 747–48. 
194 Id. at 748.  Galanter quotes one Republican political strategizer providing the 
following advice: 
[Y]ou should tap into people’s anger and frustration with practitioners of the law. 
. . .  
Make the lawyer your villain by contrasting him with the “little guy,” the 
innocent, hard-working American who he takes to the cleaners.  Describe the 
plight of the poor accident victim exploited by the ambulance-chasers and the 
charlatans—individuals who live off the misfortunes of others. 
Id. 
195 See Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 3–5 (1984).  Miller describes two arenas in which developments in the profession 
contribute to additional case volume in the courts.  He argues that a growing profession 
coupled with the collapse of previously lucrative practices, such as automobile accident 
and divorce cases, created incentives for entrepreneurial lawyering.  Id. at 3.  When 
combined with a more “litigation-oriented” student profile in law schools, these 
developments of the legal profession helped to fuel the perception of litigation crisis and 
hence the cost-and-delay narrative.  See id. at 3–4. 
196 See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 6. 
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line with the last three decades of findings, attendees of the Duke 
Conference were skeptical of the findings, since these did not seem to 
describe their experiences of litigation. 
Though Galanter provides ample support for the notion that 
corporate interests have actively invested in disseminating the cost-
and-delay narrative, nonetheless he finds it incomplete as an 
explanation for the narrative’s staying power.  He writes, “Surely 
there is an abundance of . . . calculating instrumentalism . . . but I 
would argue that, in an important sense, the proponents of the 
jaundiced view [of the civil litigation system] are creatures of the 
discourse rather than its authors.”197  Galanter suggests that we must 
understand the instrumentalist actions of interest groups within a 
broader cultural and political climate that not only shapes their 
positions but also, I would argue, helps determine what effect they 
will have.  Lobbyists and publicists work to refashion legal cases into 
caricatures that support a narrative of cost and delay, of wasteful 
litigation carried out by greedy lawyers at the expense of upstanding 
corporate citizens.198  But what makes their story compelling to 
individuals who likely have more in common with the plaintiff than 
with the corporate citizen?  What makes it resonate with the legal 
profession itself, whose members have firsthand knowledge of the 
legal system?199  To answer this question, we must turn our attention 
 
197 Galanter, supra note 155, at 740. 
198 See id. at 726–40. 
199 A pessimistic view of the legal system as a whole and of lawyers in particular is 
more widespread among elites, including lawyers, than it is in society at large.  As 
Galanter states: 
Although beliefs and grievances about the litigation explosion, undeserving 
claimants, excessive regulation, the legalization of life, and the ascendancy of 
lawyers are widely shared, they are embraced with particular fervor by large 
portions of American elites.  The jaundiced view is very much the view of “top 
people,” including politicians, media people, business people, and medical 
people—and large sections of the legal elite. 
Id. at 720 (footnote omitted).  Galanter quotes from a pollster conducting a survey of 
attitudes nationwide toward lawyers and the legal system.  The pollster concludes, 
By and large, those who see lawyers in a more favorable light than average tend 
to be downscale, women, minorities, and young. . . .  
Americans who are more critical than average tend to be more establishment, 
upscale, and male.  The higher the family income and socioeconomic status, the 
more critical the adults are.  Pluralities of college graduates feel unfavorably 
toward lawyers, while pluralities of non-college graduates feel favorably.   
Id. at 720 n.12 (quoting PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., A SURVEY OF THE 
ATTITUDES NATIONWIDE TOWARD LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 4–5 (1993)). 
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to the political and historical elements that help to sustain the cost-
and-delay narrative. 
C.  Political–Historical Factors 
An observation made by Galanter helps shed some light on why 
resolving today’s procedural battles and vanquishing the cost-and-
delay narrative proves so difficult.  As he explains, 
[P]opular opinion––is itself ambivalent about these matters, 
embracing the enlarged possibilities of remedy and protection but 
scorning others’ overeager recourse to them. . . .  “[A]lthough 
Americans respond to the rhetoric of individual ruggedness, they 
vote with an ever more legalistic fervor.  Especially since the 1960s, 
this lawyer-hating nation of individualists has supported—
demanded, even—measure after measure enacting new rights that 
can be enforced only through lawyers and courts.”200 
This ambivalence is at the heart of the cost-and-delay narrative’s 
appeal.  The persistent call to reform civil process to combat 
(undocumented) cost and delay serves as a proxy for a political 
struggle over enforcement of legal rights.  Paul Carrington 
characterizes the procedural reform movement as “[o]ne form of 
deregulation politics” which seeks to limit the regulatory regime 
established through the grant of broad court access and a multitude of 
legislatively enacted private rights of action.201  He argues that 
“[a]dvocates of this kind of deregulation urged that the costs and 
delays of excessive litigation were disabling American 
businesses.”202  Carrington asserts that although existing data weaken 
this argument, opinion makers nonetheless are “sensitive to business 
complaints.”203  Carrington explains that “the motives of many of 
those seeking reform of discovery practice were primarily substantive 
 
200 Id. at 750 (footnote omitted) (quoting WALT BACHMAN, LAW V. LIFE: WHAT 
LAWYERS ARE AFRAID TO SAY ABOUT THE LEGAL PROFESSION 92 (1995)). 
201 Carrington, supra note 165, at 607.  Carrington argues that the original design of 
civil procedural reform of the 1930s was “to enforce all the legal rights of citizens, 
whether derived from legislation or from state and federal constitutions.”  Id. at 603.  He 
describes the development of “[a] countervailing political force [that] arose to resist this 
form of privatized business regulation.”  Id. at 606. 
202 Id. at 607. 
203 Id. at 608. 
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rather than procedural: they sought economic advancement, perhaps 
especially their own, if at the cost of decreasing civil justice.”204 
Another articulation of this argument explains the influence of the 
cost-and-delay narrative as part of a backlash to the rapid expansion 
of rights, remedies, and discovery in the middle part of the twentieth 
century.205  As Congress continued to create new private rights of 
action that could serve as a private enforcement mechanism to 
deterring unlawful behavior, business interests and others began to 
push back.  Private enforcement power was increased even further 
through procedural developments, such as the 1966 revisions to the 
class action mechanism as well as the continued expansion of 
discovery available in civil suits.  Given the substantial interests at 
stake, some of this backlash may have been a cynical attempt to 
protect financial gain; but the rapid transformation that took place in 
the civil justice system enabled claims of hyperlexis, of overburdened 
courts, and of excessive cost and delay to seem plausible, even to 
resonate, with the public.206 
While preceding explanations offer useful insights, this final 
cluster of political–historical explanations are particularly helpful in 
understanding the cost-and-delay narrative.  The political–historical 
explanations suggest that the narrative is bound up in disputes over 
the role that courts should play in society and that the narrative has 
developed as that role has been reconceptualized over the course of 
the last four decades.  In particular, the political–historical 
explanations identify the disputes over more efficient procedural rules 
as a political conflict over the nature of the regulatory state and over 
the success of the courts in playing a regulatory role.  Situating the 
cost-and-delay narrative in its political and historical context can 
 
204 Id. at 610.  Thornburg too suggests a direct relationship between arguments to limit 
discovery, largely made through a narrative of cost and delay, and the substantive aim of 
limiting regulation: 
The tie between discovery and enforcement is no coincidence, and assuredly not 
a surprise to those groups seeking change.  Business groups seek to limit 
discovery precisely because those limits will make it more difficult for plaintiffs 
to prevail in products liability suits.  Having failed to pass substantive tort reform 
legislation, these groups seek procedural advantage; if the law cannot be 
changed, maybe it can be made unenforceable. 
Thornburg, supra note 182, at 254 (footnotes omitted). 
205 See Miller, supra note 165, at 992; Miller, supra note 195, at 5–6. 
206 Miller described the relationship between the expansion of substantive rights and the 
proliferation of case filings.  Miller, supra note 195, at 5–8. 
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explain otherwise mystifying aspects of the narrative, such as its 
resilience in the face of empirical evidence or the public’s 
receptiveness to cost-and-delay tales like the tort “horror stories.”207 
These accounts provide important insights into how the broader 
political context alters the civil procedural landscape.  Particularly, 
concerns over excessive cost of civil litigation, which have served as 
the driver of procedural reform for the last three decades, have staying 
power, because they give voice to a more general skepticism in 
society over economic regulation and the role of the state.  The depth 
and breadth of these analyses is shown by the fact that they are able to 
account for other, non-procedural developments in law.  This can be 
seen, for instance, in a debate that took place among legal scholars 
over the same period.  Martha Minow describes how shifts in legal 
scholarship toward interdisciplinary methodologies are reflective of a 
broad disillusionment with courts and law arising in the 1970s.  Much 
as Judith Resnik describes this process in the procedural context,208 
Minow explores this shift in the realm of legal scholarship, claiming 
that in the latter part of the twentieth century, a broad skepticism had 
developed about the value of law as a source for truth and justice.209 
The developments in scholarship reflect the disillusionment with 
law arising among the elite—and amongst the legal elite in 
particular.210  In the academic context, scholars came to doubt law’s 
ability to reach determinate answers without recourse to external 
norms.  Minow traces the development of legal thought after legal 
realism, which, through its recognition that law is a product of its 
social and political context, “shook law’s foundations in knowable 
truth, objectively determinable rights, and reliably applied 
precedents.”211  The subsequent history of American legal thought 
became an exercise in reestablishing a basis for law’s legitimacy.212  
This project dominated law through the middle half of the twentieth 
 
207 See supra Part III.B. 
208 See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 494 (1986) (documenting the Federal Rules’ drafters’ faith in the possibility of 
courts to act as truth-seeking institutions and the drastic shift away from this vision in the 
ensuing fifty years). 
209 See Martha Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73 TELOS 79 (1987) (explaining the 
move to greater interdisciplinary methodologies in legal scholarship as a result of 
widespread disillusionment with law’s ability to provide answers). 
210 There is evidence that such a dim view of law is indeed widespread among the 
nation’s elites.  See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
211 Minow, supra note 209, at 93. 
212 See id. 
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century.  New Deal policies played a role in this effort, initiating an 
expansion of the administrative state that held out the promise of law 
as an instrument of social transformation.  According to Minow, 
“[t]hat New Deal experience launched the infusion of policy analysis 
into law.”213  Through the technocratic philosophy and efforts of the 
New Deal, attorneys of the mid-twentieth century imagined that they 
would reestablish legal legitimacy.214  As the political–historical 
accounts of the cost-and-delay narrative suggest, however, the 
technocratic and administrative state bumped up against significant 
restrictions; the regulatory function itself faced political opposition, 
and there emerged palpable limitations on court-driven social change.  
Minow explains that “[i]n the context of that period of political 
turmoil [the 1960s and 1970s], these ideas did not seem to answer 
how law could both proclaim neutrality as to substantive ends and 
certainty in its internal method.”215 
According to Minow, the question this new legal scholarship 
sought to answer was “whether law can constrain raw power through 
reference to determinate norms or principles.”216  This question 
closely resembles that which plays itself out in the procedural context.  
While proceduralists once confidently projected law as capable of 
rationally constraining power, and thus appropriately regulating social 
norms, over the last several decades this belief has declined, leaving 
proceduralists dissatisfied with the rules that had been designed to 
enable such regulation. 
Resnik described this transition in 1986, as the cost-and-delay 
narrative began to gather substantial momentum: 
[T]he Rule revisions and the current proposals reflect deep 
dissatisfaction with some of the beliefs embodied in the 1938 draft.  
The dominant claim today is that the framework has provided too 
many opportunities for exploitation and manipulation and too little 
guidance for the untutored.  Many of the calls for reform seek to 
contract the occasions upon which procedure could be used—either 
by shortening the time between filing and disposition or by 
eliminating some of the procedural options.  A justification often 
offered is, essentially, that ‘less is more,’ that fewer procedural 
 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 94.  Minow describes the proliferation of scholarly trends, critical legal 
studies, law and economics, and law and literature that seek to understand law through 
disciplinary methods external to law.  Id. 
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opportunities will beget more dispositions and that more 
dispositions are inherently desirable.217 
As the demands on the civil system increased, in terms of case 
complexity, regulatory function, and sheer volume, the outcomes 
secured through extensive litigation or trial could not be shown to be 
better; in fact, they could not even be experienced, with any 
consistency, as better.218  Accordingly, the expectation that the courts 
can handle these sophisticated, difficult, and broad-ranging functions 
has declined.219 
In the nineteen-thirties, the rule drafters seemed to have had faith     
. . . in lawyer-based reforms in general.  These gentlemen spoke 
about justice, truth, and the grand accomplishments of the legal 
profession as if they genuinely believed in them all.  The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure were drafted and praised as the New Deal 
was being put into place.  Lawyers were . . . the “new high priests,” 
and they carried their faith in their abilities and messages into all 
areas of government.  In the intervening fifty years, many of these 
beliefs have been shaken.220 
The historical framework offered by Minow and Resnik allow us to 
situate the cost-and-delay narrative in much larger social debates 
about the efficacy of law and legal reform.  In so doing, the political–
historical explanations provide a rich starting point for further enquiry 
that can both explain the phenomenon of the cost-and-delay narrative 
and identify useful avenues for those that seek to counter the 
narrative’s corrosive effect on access to civil justice. 
 
217 Resnik, supra note 208, at 529. 
218 See id. at 529–30.  Resnik identifies the same hostility to attorneys described by 
other scholars in media reports and statements by politicians, only she finds it in the 
Supreme Court itself: 
The Court’s hostility to lawyers and to the procedures they engender is palpable: 
“It is scarcely open to doubt that if claimants were permitted to retain 
compensated attorneys the day might come when it could be said that an attorney 
might indeed be necessary to present a claim properly in a system rendered more 
adversary and more complex by the very presence of lawyer representation.” 
Id. at 530 (quoting Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 
(1985)). 
219 See id. at 538 (“In sum, on both the criminal and the civil sides—and relying upon 
rules, cases, and informal practices—the judiciary is in the midst of devising or borrowing 
mechanisms to bypass adjudication.”). 
220 Id. at 540–41.  Additionally, Resnik stated, “The problems sought to have been 
resolved through procedural reform persist, and some accuse procedure of masking or 
worsening the indignities visited upon the citizenry.  The decline in faith in adjudication 
and some of the open hostility towards the courts are based upon this absence of progress.”  
Id. at 541 (footnote omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
The most recent data on civil process in federal courts give a fairly 
positive snapshot of the system’s operation.  Costs appear to be driven 
largely by a party’s assessment of what is at stake in the case; 
discovery tends to generate the right amount of information while also 
being tied to stakes; and total dollar amounts for median cases tend to 
be far lower than the popular imagination would envision.  Yet, at the 
very same moment, reports generated by prestigious bar associations 
and research institutes describe a system that is in “need of urgent 
attention.”  These diverging images of the civil justice system have 
been a fixture of procedural discourse for the last three decades. 
Attorney opinion surveys routinely document that procedural doubt 
abounds and that doubt wears the cloak of the cost-and-delay 
narrative, yet the empirical data demand that we examine this doubt 
and not take it at face value.  The historical–political explanations 
allow us to contextualize the narrative in order to understand its 
success and the political role that it plays.  While the empirical work 
is helpful in debunking the cost-and-delay narrative, the historical–
political accounts should remind us that these discussions about 
procedure cannot be, in the final analysis, empirical.  Rather, we must 
be mindful that procedure is a normative enterprise.  For even if the 
empirical data served to confirm the worst suspicions of the cost-and-
delay narrative, that fact would not dictate a response.221  Thus, to 
address the questions raised by the cost-and-delay narrative requires 
us to focus on first principles and on the role that we would like 
courts to play in our society.  Common-sense appeals to reduction of 
cost and delay unhelpfully obscure more fundamental questions.  
Surely, cheaper and faster processes are better, all else being equal.  
But all else is not equal, and so the difficult work begins. 
 
221 For example, if delay concerns center around judicial case burdens, one solution 
might involve appointing more judges, rather than finding ways to decrease case filings. 
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